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## Storia Militare Moderna

a cura di  
VIRGILIO ILARI



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*Ultima Ratio Regum* (Estrema ragione dei Re) iscrizione su un cannone all'ingresso del Museo di Storia Militare di Budapest. Foto O. Mustafiri, CC0 1.0 Universal Public Domain Dedication (Wikipedia commons).

Il celebre motto fu apposto sulle canne delle artiglierie francesi fuse dal 1650 al 1793, e anche su parte delle coeve artiglierie sabaude. La variante *ultima ratio regis* (estrema ragione del re) fu usata a partire dal 1742 sulle artiglierie prussiane e successivamente anche sui cannoni spagnoli, mentre l'analogo *regis ultima ratio* è tuttora il motto dell'artiglieria belga.

# «People at arms»<sup>1</sup> and soldiers in Lefkada during the Septinsular Republic (1800-1807)

By SEVASTI LAZARI

**ABSTRACT.** In this essay, we tried to discuss the effects that the permanent threat of war had on the Lefkadians' lives as well as the choices they made: the way they participated in the discussions about the future of the Septinsular Republic, the way they claimed civil rights and the way the ruling class of the island evaded them. The military had a constant presence on the island, as it had on the other islands. Its structure and its burden on the island's finances are quite eloquently presented by the island's financial accounts. The villagers serving for the defense of the island are mentioned in the 1802 accounts, at the same period when the people of the island massively participated to claim civil rights. Through the island's enlistment list of 1805, it is possible to highlight the State's attempt to implement universal recruitment, corresponding to European standards. This emersion of simple people did not go unnoticed by some members of the upper class who acknowledged the role they played in the defense of the island. Thus, it is apparent that the people of the island had the opportunity to participate in the changes of the period in both emerging but not yet shaped identities, that of citizen and that of soldier.

**KEYWORDS.** LEFKADA, SEPTINSULAR REPUBLIC, PEOPLE AT ARMS, SOLDIERS, MILITARY, CERNIDE, TRUPPA CIVICA, CIVIL RIGHTS, CITIZEN, CONSTITUTION, RUSSIAN TURKS, ALI PASHA.

1 See the relevant comment made by Anna Giourga Settini in her letter of 13/6/1807, concerning the residents of Lefkada during the siege of the island from Ali Pasha in 1807: «οι εγκάτοικοι όλοι είναι εις τα άρματα, και εις τα απαρθνείζοντα πόστα, απεφασισμένοι να θυσιαστούν διά την δόξαν του γένους και πατρίδος». Panos RONTOGIANNIS, *Ιστορία της νήσου Λευκάδος*, Vol 2, Athens, Society for Lefkadian Studies, 1982, p. 190; Dimitris ARVANITAKIS, «Οι επιστολές του 1807: Πού τέμνεται ο λόγος της Ιστοριογραφίας με το λόγο των τεκμηρίων;», in *Πρακτικά 14' Συμποσίου, Γιορτές Λόγου και Τέχνης. Λευκάδα 3-5 Αυγούστου 2009*, Athens, Society for Lefkadian Studies, 2010, pp. 127-156.

During the period between 1797 and 1815, the Ionian Islands passed from Venetian sovereignty to the sovereignty of the democratic French, the Russian Turks, the imperial French and finally the British. Thus, their fate linked the impact of the Venetian heritage to the European rivalries in the region, but also to the dynamics that the Enlightenment and the French Revolution unleashed. At the same time, they had the opportunity to test their powers in governance through the political formation of the Septinsular Republic, established by the Convention of Constantinople (March 21st, 1800), a semi-sovereign state<sup>2</sup> with Greek roots.<sup>3</sup> In a conflicting and at the same time consensual environment, under the weight of the decisions of changing international conditions, but also of the different orientation of the islanders, this “aristocratic” state was modelled after Ragusa and ruled by the *principali* and *notabili*.<sup>4</sup>

Although the presence of the French democrats, during the period that preceded its creation, spread new ideas and concepts (equality, democracy, freedom, homeland, nation) that created conditions for change on the islands,<sup>5</sup> the Septin-

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- 2 According to Nikos ALIVISATOS' denomination, «Τα τρία επτανησιακά συντάγματα (1800, 1803, 1817), Ο διεθνής και ο τοπικός τους περίγυρος», in *Πρακτικά Κ' Συμποσίου. Αλλαγές κυριαρχιών. Ρήξεις και νέοι θεσμοί στα Επτάνησα από το 1797 έως το 1815*, Athens, Society for Lefkadian Studies, 2016, p. 39.
  - 3 See the interesting comment by Spyros I. ASDRACHAS, «Το ιστορικό “απόβαρο” της Επτανήσου Πολιτείας», in Aliki NIKIFOROU (Ed.), *Συνταγματικά κείμενα των Ιονίων Νήσων*, Athens, Hellenic Parliament Foundation, 2008, p.18, on the importance of the rising historical subjects and the connection of the idea of democracy with the adoption of the Greek language.
  - 4 NIKIFOROU (Ed.), *Συνταγματικά κείμενα των Ιονίων Νήσων*, cit., p. 139. Costituzione dell'anno 1800. «Articolo I. Sua maestà l'imperatore di tutte le Russie, considerando che le suddette Isole per l'innanzi Venete, in vista alla loro prossimità colla Morea e l'Albania, interessano particolarmente la sicurezza e tranquillità dei Stati della Sublime Porta, è stato convenuto, che le Isole stesse ad instar della Repubblica di Ragusi formerebbero una Repubblica soggetta a titolo di Suzerainità alla Sublime Porta, e governata dai *Principali e Notabili* del Paese [...] e la detta Repubblica essendo Vassalla della Sublime Porta, cioè a dire dipendente, soggetta, e protetta, i doveri di questa Protezione, saranno religiosamente osservati dalla Sublime Porta in favor della suddetta Repubblica».
  - 5 See Alexandra SFOINI, «Έθνος και πατρίδα. Λέξεις-κλειδιά του Διαφωτισμού και της Γαλλικής Επανάστασης», in Anna MANDYLARA and Giorgos NIKOLAOU (Eds.), *Η Φιλική Εταιρεία. Επαναστατική Δράση και μυστικές εταιρείες στη νεότερη Ευρώπη*, Athens, Nikolaos Skoufas Municipality – Asini Publishers, 2017, pp. 41-65; Dimitris ARVANITAKIS, «Η πατρίδα, οι πολίτες και οι πατριώτες», in *Πρακτικά Κ' Συμποσίου. Αλλαγές κυριαρχιών. Ρήξεις και νέοι θεσμοί στα Επτάνησα από το 1797 έως το 1815*, Athens, Society for Lefkadian Studies, 2016, pp. 121-136; IDEM, *Η αγωγή του πολίτη. Η γαλλική παρουσία στο Ιόνιο*



sular State was forced to adapt to the conservatism of Russia and the Ottoman Empire, the two sovereign States that permitted its creation.<sup>6</sup> However, even after the eviction of the French democrats from the islands, the dynamism of the French ideas continued to spark widespread mobilizations and is reflected in its most liberal Constitution, that of 1803, in the establishment of constitutional nobility instead of hereditary nobility.<sup>7</sup>

As the establishment of the State took place in a turbulent international environment, it is obvious that the State could not be left out of the competition of foreign powers for the Ionian region. Consequently, in order to ensure peace and security on the islands, the State attempted to create its own army, even though to a large extent, it remained dependent on Russian military forces to the very end. Although creating a local regular army was a necessity for the State, as on one hand it faced internal disturbances and upheavals especially during the period between 1799 and 1802, and on the other hand it faced the constant threats from Ali Pasha of Ioannina, it was evidently a difficult project because of financial reasons as well as because of the lack of recruitment.

In this study, we shall attempt to discuss the effects that the permanent threat of war had on people's lives as well the choices they made using the example of Lefkada. As its administrators stated in 1800, the border question provided its population with alternating periods of peace and terror.<sup>8</sup> The constant threat of war affected the way the islanders, mobilized by powerful internal groups in close collaboration with foreign powers, fought for the Russian Turks in 1798. It also affected the way the Lefkadians participated in the discussions about the future of the State, prioritizing the security of the island as a necessary condition for its economic survival. Finally, it affected the way they claimed civil rights, since

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(1797-1799) και το έθνος των Ελλήνων, Herakleion, Crete University Press, 2020.

6 NIKOS KARAPIDAKIS, «Τα Επτάνησα. Ευρωπαϊκοί ανταγωνισμοί μετά την πτώση της Βενετίας», in *Ιστορία του Νέου Ελληνισμού 1770-2000*, Vol. 1, Athens, Ta Nea, 2003, pp. 151-184; NIKOLAOS MOSCHONAS, «Τα Ιόνια νησιά κατά την περίοδο 1797-1821», in *Ιστορία του Ελληνικού Έθνους*, Vol. 11, Athens, Ekdotike Athinon, 1982, pp. 382-402.

7 ALIVISATOS, «Τα τρία επτανησιακά συντάγματα (1800, 1803, 1817), Ο διεθνής και ο τοπικός τους περίγυρος», cit., p. 44, considers the 1803 Constitution as one of the most characteristic examples of moderate liberalism in our modern history.

8 KONSTANTINOS G. MACHAIRAS, *Πολιτική και Διπλωματική Ιστορία της Λευκάδος (1797-1810)*, Athens, 1954, Vol. 1, p. 181, (January 27, 1800): «Η εξέλιξις του συνοριακού ζητήματος παρέχει ημίν και τω πληθυσμώ τούτω εναλλαγάς ησυχίας και τρόμου».

it allowed the administration of the island to use it to its own advantage by evading these claims on the grounds of the threat of war. The budget and expenses' accounts from the island's Archive add to our knowledge of the structure of military forces on the island and describe, quite eloquently, its burden on its finances. Finally, through the island's enlistment list of 1805, it is possible to highlight the State's attempt to implement universal recruitment, corresponding to European standards. Although, the State did not have time to fully implement this type of recruitment, a number of the Ionians served, together with the Russian forces, the Septinsular militia based on the armed Greek corps at the service of Russians and continental auxiliaries in the siege of Lefkada. Thus, the State made use of its human resources and of their experience, as the Ionians took up arms to defend their *πατρίδα* (homeland), that is the entity of the Seven Islands and their State.<sup>9</sup>

It is therefore worth following the equivocal step of the inhabitants of Lefkada in both directions, that of the citizen and the soldier, a procedure that, in the context of the Septinsular Republic living under constant threat of war and in a changing international environment, did not develop as it had in western European states.<sup>10</sup>

During the transitional period from French to Russian-Turkish rule, from mid-September 1798 until the surrender of the French garrison to the Russian-Turkish (3/14-11-1798), the inhabitants of Lefkada and their representatives set two goals: firstly, to expel the French and secondly, to prevent Ali Pasha's attempts to occupy the island. Although the majority of the inhabitants of the Seven Islands participated in the anti-French front,<sup>11</sup> there was a significant difference in

9 Triandafylos E. SKLAVENTIS, «Ιδεολογικές ανατροπές και συνθέσεις», in *Πρακτικά Κ' Συμποσίου. Αλλαγές κυριαρχιών. Ρήξεις και νέοι θεσμοί στα Επτάνησα από το 1797 έως το 1815*, Athens, Society for Lefkadian Studies, 2016, pp.47-60.

10 André CORVISIER, «Armées, État et Administration dans les temps modernes», in *Histoire comparée de l'administration (IVe-XVIIIe siècles)*, Vol. 9, Ostfildern, Thorbecke Verlag, 1980, pp. 555-569; Alan FORREST, Karen HAGEMANN and Jane RENDALL (Eds.), *Soldiers, Citizens and Civilians. Experiences and Perceptions of the Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars, 1790-1820*, Palgrave, McMillan, 2009.

11 The majority of the inhabitants of the islands sided with the anti-French current, disappointed by the failed promises and the economic problems of the French government. At the same time, the nobles were encouraged by the appearance of the Russians Turks in the Ionian Sea and by the anti-Enlightenment current formed by the Orthodox Church. Dimitris ARVANITAKIS, *Η αγωγή του πολίτη. Η γαλλική παρουσία στο Ιόνιο (1797-1799) και το έθνος των Ελλήνων*, cit., pp. 635-705; MACHAIRAS, *Πολιτική και Διπλωματική Ιστορία της*





Coat of arms of the Republic of the Eptanese

the case of Lefkada. The island faced immediate danger from the military forces of Ali Pasha gathered on the opposite coast, so the French military forces were necessary to defend the island. This resulted in an ambivalent attitude of the inhabitants of the island towards the French forces, at least until the arrival of the Russian-Turkish fleets.

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*Λευκάδος (1797-1810)*, cit., Vol. 1, pp. 77-79, 85-88, lists the causes of frustration felt by the Lefkadians towards the French: the administrative incorporation of Lefkada into the prefecture of Ithaca, with its base in Cephalonia; their attempt to impose a forced loan; the expenses of recruitment; the unfair commercial competition by Peter Dupré, under his dual qualities, as French commissioner and vice-consul of France in Arta; the disrespect shown by the French soldiers to the religious feelings of the locals.

Thus, while quite few of the inhabitants of the city but none of the villagers enlisted in the national guard that the French general Hotte attempted to organize before the end of August,<sup>12</sup> the administrators of the island offered the help requested by the French generals who had arrived from Cephalonia in order to strengthen the small fort located inside the channel between Lefkada and Akarnania (Fortino), as well as the Castle of Santa Maura.<sup>13</sup> Both the inhabitants of the island and the French military forces were determined not to surrender the island to Ali Pasha, especially after the tragic fate of the inhabitants of Preveza and Vonitsa and their French garrison on their capture by Ali Pasha (12/23-10-1798).<sup>14</sup>

However, with the expected arrival of the Russian-Turkish fleets (which finally arrived on October 27th), the island's administrators refused to join the French in the defense of the island and forced them to retreat to the Castle. As a means of pressure, the former used the French soldiers who, driven from Cephalonia, had taken refuge in the southern part of Lefkada and were arrested by the island's armed villagers. The control on the island quickly fell into the hands of the armed followers of the Russian Turks, who were probably mobilized by Angelo Orio, a Venetian aristocrat who resided permanently on the island and a personal friend of the Russian, admiral Ushakov. Their followers invaded the city and took over the government of the island forcing its previous administration to resign. Meanwhile, on October 27th, the Russian Turks docked at Alexander's Bay, demanding the surrender of the French garrison. The latter, consisting of 500 men (among whom 40 were officers), finally surrendered to the Russian Turks on November 14th, 1798.<sup>15</sup>

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12 On the military organization of the French, see Nicholas PAPPAS, *Greeks in Russian Military service in the late 18th and early 19th centuries*, Thessaloniki, Institute for Balkan Studies, 1991, pp.97-98. See also the budget and expenditure accounts during the French period in GENERAL STATE ARCHIVES OF GREECE, ARCHIVES OF LEFKADA (hereafter: GSA, AL), Φάκ. 38 (1789-1836), *Στατιστικοί Πίνακες*.

13 Details of the preparations in MACHAIRAS, *Πολιτική και Διπλωματική Ιστορία της Λευκάδος (1797-1810)*, cit., Vol. 1, pp. 81-85.

14 *Ibid.*, pp. 97-101; RONTOGIANNIS, *Ιστορία της νήσου Λευκάδος*, cit., Vol. 2, p. 15.

15 MACHAIRAS, *Πολιτική και Διπλωματική Ιστορία της Λευκάδος (1797-1810)*, cit., Vol. 1, pp. 103-114; RONTOGIANNIS, *Ιστορία της νήσου Λευκάδος*, cit., Vol. 2, pp. 42-46; Gerassimos E. MAVROGIANNIS, *Ιστορία των Ιονίων νήσων, 1797-1815*, Vol. 1, Athens, 1889, pp. 213-216; Panagiotis CHIOTIS, *Ιστορία της Επτανήσου και ιδίως της Ζακύνθου από βενετοκρατίας μέχρι της ελεύσεως των Άγγλων. 1500-1816*, Corfu, 1863, pp. 693-695.

Contemporary sources discuss the wide participation of the Lefkadians both in the events of the expulsion of the French and their defense against Ali Pasha. As P. Rontogiannis correctly commented, the number of 8.000 armed Lefkadians at the time of the expulsion of the Democratic French from the island, stated by Tarle, is exaggerated.<sup>16</sup> N. Pappas mentions that 390 Russian and Turkish marines, together with over 1.000 Lefkadian volunteers, took part in the siege against the French garrison.<sup>17</sup>

Though the exact number of participants is unknown, it seems that certain groups of armed residents, as well as others, were recruited by people of the higher social strata, imbued with pro-Russian sentiments and also sentiments for their homeland. Thus, Spyridion Servo, who decided to «sacrifice himself for his neighbors and his homeland», armed all his fellow countrymen from Caria to defend the small fortress Fortino, the one that the French had fortified.<sup>18</sup> Although the exact number is missing, we can estimate it, if we take into consideration census data. Caria had 232 men aged 14-60 in 1788 and 265 aged 17-50 in 1824.<sup>19</sup> Conte Piero Zankarol was another recruiter from an important family of the island who «risked his life for his homeland».<sup>20</sup> Some of these people were certainly ex-Russian officers, and such was Zuanne Vlassopoulo, from Ithaca. Vlassopoulo equipped a vessel under the Russian flag and patrolled the channel between the island and Akarnania, presenting himself as an alleged emissary of the Russian

16 RONTOGIANNIS, *Ιστορία της νήσου Λευκάδος*, cit., Vol. 2, p. 45.

17 PAPPAS, *Greeks in Russian Military service in the late 18th and early 19th centuries*, cit., p. 103.

18 MACHAIRAS, *Πολιτική και Διπλωματική Ιστορία της Λευκάδος (1797-1810)*, cit., Vol. 1, p. 107. «Εἰς τέτοιαν περίστασιν λοιπόν εχρειάσθη ζήλος, πόθος και αγάπη πατρίδος διά να εμποδισθῆ ἡ ορμή του πολεμίου [...] Ὅθεν αὐτός (ο Σέρβος) ἀπεφάσισε να θυσιάσθῆ διά τον πλησίον του και την Πατρίδα».

19 EFTYCHIA D. LIATA, «Καλοί μας ομόφυλοι και γενναίοι Κερκυραίοι... Ἐκκλήση των Λευκαδίων για συμμετοχή τους στο μεταρρυθμισμένο πολίτευμα της Επτανήσου Πολιτείας (1802), *Επετηρίς, ΙΓ' (2012-2016)*, Athens, Society for Lefkadian Studies, 2016, pp. 76-77; SEVASTI LAZARI, «Δημογραφικές πληροφορίες για τη Λευκάδα (1760, 1788, 1824)», in *Πρακτικά Δ' Συνεδρίου Επτανησιακού πολιτισμού. Από την τοπική ιστορία στη συνολική. Το παράδειγμα της Λευκάδας, 15ος-19ος αι.*, Athens, 1996, pp. 247-248.

20 MACHAIRAS, *Πολιτική και Διπλωματική Ιστορία της Λευκάδος (1797-1810)*, cit., Vol. 1, pp.108-109: «διεκρίθη εξαιρετικώς, θυσιάσας συμφέροντα, ανέσεις και αναπαύσεις και ρηγοκινδυνεύσας και την ζωήν του χάριν της πατρίδος», in *Libro decretazioni dell'Amministrazione Governativa di Santa Maura (1798-1801)*, according to Machairas' reference.

army. As such, he misinformed Ali Pasha's officers as to the time of arrival of the Russian-Turkish fleets, thus postponing any hostile action by the Pasha.<sup>21</sup>

The new rulers had to face two issues: that of the temporary administration of the island, an urgent one considering the many armed villagers bustling around, and that of the defense of the island, given the proximity of Ali Pasha. Angelo Orio had a leading role to play in both. He supervised the formation of the new Council from both the class of nobles and the second class that would elect the new authorities, a council more restricted than the one existing during the Venetian period.<sup>22</sup> Implementing the orders of the Russian and Turkish admirals in order to reinforce the Russian-Turkish force that took over the island, Orio recruited two companies of 66 soldiers (2 sergeants, 4 corporals, 60 soldiers) to serve as regulars placed under the command of Zuanne Vlassopoulo and Nikola Paleologo, Russian officers of Greek origin.<sup>23</sup>

During this transitional period, Angelo Orio played an important role, both in the formation of the provisional government of the Seven Islands and in the negotiations for its Constitution. He viewed the ongoing changes from an "aristocratic" perspective, far from the revolutionary spirit of the Republican French, as can be seen from the provisions of the Provisional Plan of Government of the Ionian Islands, which he drafted.<sup>24</sup> Moreover, in the discussions that took place for the establishment of the State, for Orio and the Lefkadians, it was of top priority

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21 *Ibid.*, pp. 105-106.

22 *Ibid.*, pp. 122-126.

23 *Ibid.*, pp. 118-120. See Table I (budget of 1/12/1798 – 30/11/1799). Zuanne Vlassopoulo became Russian consul for Preveza in 1804 and Paleologo commander of the Himariote section of the Legion of Light Riflemen in 1805. PAPPAS, *Greeks in Russian Military service in the late 18th and early 19th centuries*, cit., p. 142, note 64.

24 Angelo Orio drew up a Provisional Plan of Government [Constitution] of the Ionian Islands, which the Ionians approved on May 24th, 1799, as a base for discussion of the future Constitution of the State with the dominant powers, Russia and the Ottoman Empire. Provision was made for enlargement of the Councils with persons having an urban lifestyle, who did not practice manual work and had a certain annual income – in Lefkada an annual income of 60 cecchini was required. There was also a future provision for the entry of educated persons (persons having «educazione civile») with an annual income of 180 cecchini. Finally, an important provision was made by the Article 24 concerning the use of the Modern Greek language in courts, so that the inhabitants of the islands could attend their cases, a provision that was reintroduced in the Constitution of 1803. NIKIFOROU (Ed.), *Συνταγματικά κείμενα των Ιονίων Νήσων*, cit., pp. 663-671 (*Provisorio Piano del Governo dell'Isole ex Venete*).



to preserve the independence of the State and the continental appendages of the former Venetian possessions, of Preveza, Vonitsa, Parga and Butrint (Butrintò). As such, their goal deviated from those of the members of the other mission sent to form the Constitution of the State. This mission, represented by Gradenigo Siguro Desylla and Antonomaria Kapodistria, succeeded in establishing the conditions of trade in the new State and its flag.<sup>25</sup>

As the continental appendages were eventually ceded to the Ottoman Porte – having the privileges of Moldavia and Wallachia –, the geographical and economic relationship of the island with the opposite coast was broken for a number of reasons.<sup>26</sup> The economic transactions with the opposite coast were blocked<sup>27</sup> and as the mainland appendages were now governed by a complex régime, the value of real estate held there by the Lefkadians was reduced to zero,<sup>28</sup> since Ali

25 For details on the two missions' different goals and Orio's protests, see MACHAIRAS, *Πολιτική και Διπλωματική Ιστορία της Λευκάδος (1797-1810)*, cit., Vol. 1, pp. 221-239, 257-265; ΜΑΥΡΟΓΙΑΝΝΙΣ, *Ιστορία των Ιονίων νήσων, 1797-1815*, cit., Vol. 1, pp. 279-282; ΧΗΟΤΙΣ, *Ιστορία της Επτανήσου και ιδίως της Ζακύνθου από βενετοκρατίας μέχρι της ελεύσεως των Αγγλων. 1500-1816*, cit., pp. 739-740, 754-755; Ermanno LUNZI, *Della Repubblica Settinsulare, Libri Due*, Bologna, 1863, pp. 14-15, 40-42, 256-259; ΝΙΚΙΦΟΡΟΥ (Ed.), *Συνταγματικά κείμενα των Ιονίων Νήσων*, cit., pp. 103-104, 701-706.

26 On the consequences of this administrative change, see Thanassis ΚΑΛΑΦΑΤΙΣ, «Τα συντάγματα της Επτανήσου Πολιτείας (1800-1807). Όρια και αντιθέσεις», in Alikí ΝΙΚΙΦΟΡΟΥ (Ed.), *Επτάνησος Πολιτεία (1800-1807): τα μείζονα ιστορικά ζητήματα*, Corfu, General State Archives of Corfu, 2001, pp. 21-28; Eftychia ΚΟΣΜΑΤΟΥ, «Η τύχη των βενετικών ηπειρωτικών κτήσεων», in Alikí ΝΙΚΙΦΟΡΟΥ (Ed.), *Επτάνησος Πολιτεία (1800-1807): τα μείζονα ιστορικά ζητήματα*, cit., pp. 61-72.

27 The Lefkadians quickly realized the serious consequences these treaties had for them, for their island was blocked and there was no more trade («δεν έχει πλέον αλισβερίσι»). See MACHAIRAS, *Πολιτική και Διπλωματική Ιστορία της Λευκάδος (1797-1810)*, cit., Vol. 1, p. 191. The island depended for food and livestock as well as work on the opposite coast. Xavier SCROFANI, *Voyage en Grèce fait en 1794 et 1795*, III, Paris-Strasbourg, 1801, p. 22, mentioned that in 1794, food was sufficient for six months. Edward DODWELL, *A classical and topographical tour through Greece during the years 1801, 1805 and 1806*, London, 1819, p. 53, stated that the production of cereals, in the productive years, sustained  $\frac{3}{4}$  of the inhabitants, but sometimes it was enough for only  $\frac{1}{2}$  of the year. This information is confirmed by the French memorandum of 1808, which stated that grain imports together with livestock imports covered the majority of the 75,000 thalers spent on imports, while the grain produced by the island was sufficient only for six months. Cf. Dimitris ANOGIATIS-PÉLÉ (Ed.), *Six rapports français concernant les îles Ioniennes et le Continent voisin (1798-1809)*, Corfu, Ionian University, 1993, p. 38.

28 Spyros I. ASDRACHAS, «Όψεις από το προνομιακό καθεστώς της Πάργας, Πρέβεζας και Βόνιτσας», in *Ελληνική κοινωνία και οικονομία ιη' και ιθ' αι. Νεοελληνικά μελετήματα*, Ath-

Pasha was buying up the land in the area.<sup>29</sup>

Moreover, by provisions of the Imperial Diploma and its Constitution, the State took on the obligation to keep neutral and not to offer refuge to fugitives or to subjects of the Ottoman Porte in its territory.<sup>30</sup> However, a number of *kleftes* from Epirus and Olympus fled to the islands mostly after their persecution by Ali Pasha, giving him reasons to intervene, by demanding the persecution of these fugitives. Although the State tried to solve this problem by signing specific treaties with the powerful Pasha (November 1803 and May 1806),<sup>31</sup> it was quite difficult for the Republic to apply the terms of the treaties and avoid friction with

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ens, Hermes, 1988, pp. 199-222.

29 See in GSA, AL, Αρχαιοθήκη Αρχαιοφυλακείου, Α., Ιστορικά, Φακ. 31, *Κτήματα Λευκαδίων εν Πρεβέζη και Βονίτση καταληφθέντα παρά του Αλή Πασσά*.

30 ΝΙΚΙΦΟΡΟΥ (Ed.), *Συνταγματικά κείμενα των Ιονίων Νήσων*, cit., p. 140. Costituzione dell'anno 1800. «Articolo V. Le Fortezze e altre opere qualunque esistenti attualmente nelle Isole suddette, dovendo essere rimesse alla predetta Repubblica, ella deve senza dubbio provvedere alla loro difesa mettendovi guarnigione, e nella maniera che lo giudicherà a proposito; ma perché queste Isole sieno al coperto da tutti gli avvenimenti possibili durante la presente Guerra, nel caso in cui essa medesima non avesse forze sufficienti, sarà permesso alla Corte della Russia, e alla Sublime Porta, ovvero ai Commandanti delle loro Squadre rispettive, di far entrare nelle fortezze delle truppe regulate, coll'assenso, ogni Volta, della Repubblica, e dietro al concentrato reciproco tra le due alte Parti contaenti, o tra li Commandanti delle loro forze Navali. Queste truppe vi saranno di guarnigione per il tempo che sarà necessario, secondo le circostanze degli affari [...]». *Ibid.*, p.690. Diplôme Imperial: «il n'est pas improbable que les malfaiteurs et rebelles de l'Archipel, mais surtout des habitans des montagnes de Gouraf qui s'etendent depuis la Morée jusqu' au littoral de l'Albanie, des individus des peuplades de Soulos et Tcham, des districts de Vonitsa et Chimera appelés Coroloch, en un mot de toute autre Contrée de la Sublime Porte, aillent pour cause de rebellion, de brigandage ou pour tout autre motif et sujet, chercher un azile dans les susdites Isles, en raison de leur site. [...] la Republique les fera tout aussitot chercher, saisir, emprisonner et après verification faite d'ou ils sont et de quel lieu ils sont en fuite, Elle les envera enchainés à l'Officier Commandant de ce lieu et s'empresera d' informer du fait ma Sublime Porte [...] Pareillement si quelques habitans des susdites Isles coupables de brigandage ou de quelque autre crime, dans l'espoir de se sauver, s'enfuirent, se refugient soit à terre, soit sur quelque batiment de ma Flotte Imperiale ou marchand, lorsque la Republique reclamera de semblables individus on ne fera aucune difficulté de les livrer tout aussitôt. Si des Rayas de ma Sublime Porte vont, sous pretexte de commerce, ou sous tout autre, s'establir dans ces Isles pour y fixer leur demeure, ils n'y seront reçus, en aucune maniere [...]».

31 Emmanuel G. PROTOSALTIS, «Πολιτικά διαπραγματεύσεις και συνθήκαι μεταξύ Επτανήσου Πολιτείας και Αλή πασά (1800-1807)», in *Πρακτικά Τρίτου Πανιωνίου Συνεδρίου, 23-29 Σεπτεμβρίου 1965*, Vol. 1, Athens, 1965, pp. 329-352. RONTOGIANNIS, *Ιστορία της νήσου Λευκάδος*, Vol. 2, cit., pp. 150-151, 156.



him, as he considered, not unjustly, the islands and Lefkada in particular to be a haven for *kleftes*.

So, the State and the administration of Lefkada tried to conform to the terms of the treaties, at least in appearance, as their correspondence with the Ottoman officials reveals, while gradually the number of the fugitives, *kleftes* and *armatoloi* from the Ottoman territories increased, especially after the fall of Souli (December 1803).

In Lefkada, some documents, such as the budgets of certain years, allow us to approach both the structure of its military forces and its financial burden (Tables I-V). Thus, between 1/12/1798 and 31/8/1800, a Russian-Turkish garrison was quartered in the island's castle, withdrawing in the August of 1800. The island's defense also consisted of two recruited corps, an unspecified number of *cernide*<sup>32</sup> and a ship (brigantin) patrolling the channel between the island and Akarnania.

The Russian-Turkish garrison did not exceed 15 soldiers, 1 corporal and 1 officer for each of the two dominions. Such garrisons of 10-15 men for each of the two dominions were placed on all of the major islands, except Corfu, where a bigger army was stationed. For reasons concerning their policies in the area, the Russians started to withdraw in the summer of 1800, leaving small garrisons of 10-12 men on each of the major islands (Corfu sustained a bigger army), until their final withdrawal in the summer of 1801.<sup>33</sup> So, we can presume that there must have been a similar military force on the island of Lefkada from the summer of 1800 until the summer of 1801.

Although the military Russian force was permanently stationed on the island during that period, it does not seem to have been the same with the Turkish garrison. Details of the expenses of the year 1799-1800 reveal that their force during this period consisted of 12 men (*levanti*) serving part time, some of whom also served in the navy. The expenses for their wages were 72,38% of that for the Russian garrison because of their sporadic presence. Nevertheless, in the budget made in September 1799, the same expenses for each garrison were planned.

32 Ioannis D. PSARAS, *Ο θεσμός της πολιτοφυλακής στις βενετικές κτήσεις του Ελληνικού χώρου (16ος-18ος αι.)*, Thessaloniki, Vaniias, 1990; MACHAIRAS, *Πολιτική και Διπλωματική Ιστορία της Λευκάδος (1797-1810)*, cit., Vol. 1, p. 36, note 2.

33 PAPPAS, *Greeks in Russian Military service in the late 18th and early 19th centuries*, cit., pp. 129-131.

Apart from the Russian Turks troops, an auxiliary military force was also created. As we have seen, immediately after the occupation of the island by the Russian Turks, a regular force of two companies of 66 soldiers (2 captains, 2 sergeants, 4 corporals, 60 soldiers) was formed. Their expenses, almost double of the expenses for the Russian Turkish garrison, were planned in the budget made on 1/12/1798. They probably consisted of Schiavoni and Italiani militia, as the budget provision for their barracks' rent shows us (Table I), but the actual duration of their service on the island is unknown. However, they were no longer in service on the island during the period 1/9/1799 – 31/8/1800 (Table II).<sup>34</sup> Instead, during this period, two companies, each of 24 men (*levanti*), served under the orders of Andrea Tryfo and Zafiri Diedo. Consisting of irregulars (*levanti*), they were formed in January 1799, that is only two months after the formation of the first group.<sup>35</sup> This force, as the previous one, consumed a large part of the military expenses, 40,93% of the military and defense expenses or 29,73% of all the expenses made.

The patrolling ship in the channel between the island and Akarnania was supposed to employ 12 *levanti*, 1 military captain and a captain. However, most of the time, it was out of service, as only 15% of its planned expenses was made. This rather disappointing situation of the patrolling ship provoked the reaction of the plenipotentiary A.N. Tisengausen, appointed by the Russian admiral Ushakov, who in January 1800 demanded the dismissal of its governor, Konstantin Psoma, as well as the dismissal of other captains, namely Nikola Paleologo, the two leaders of the *cernide* and some other civilian officers.<sup>36</sup> Although finances, together with the inactive situation of these specific forces, seem to have provoked this reaction, it appears that it could have also been connected to the effort made by the central command to bring the military forces under its control by demanding that they should be held accountable to civilian authorities.<sup>37</sup> Taking into consideration

34 *Ibid.*, pp. 123-124. In 1800, there was a provisional regular force in Zante consisting of 4 companies (120 men), most of them South Slavs and Italians, while most of their officers were Ionian Greeks.

35 ΜΑΧΑΪΡΑΣ, *Πολιτική και Διπλωματική Ιστορία της Λευκάδος (1797-1810)*, cit., Vol. 1, p.128.


36 *Ibid.*, pp. 155-159.

37 ΠΑΠΠΑΣ, *Greeks in Russian Military service in the late 18th and early 19th centuries*, cit., pp. 127-128.

the turbulent period, such an intention seems very probable.

A corps of artillery under Zuanne Parmezan served on the island between 1/9/1799 and 31/8/1800, although initially it was not proposed in the budget. Its cost amounted to 12,24% of the military expenses and 8,89% of all the expenses. In these accounts, the wages of the military involved as well as of the officers of the *cernide* are recorded.

Chasing the fugitives and restoring order was the main duty of the *cernide* force. However, in pursuing this goal, the administration of the island mobilized all available forces. So, in March-April 1800, Captain Konstantin Saltes was asked to order 6 soldiers from G. Parmezan's company (artillery) to help the *cernide* force to chase *kleftes* and bandits. As the ship patrolling the channel was out of service, the governors of the island equipped two small ships, a *trata* and a *gaita*, with 12 sailors and requested Captain Trifo's detachment of 24 *levanti* to help. They were also ready, if needed, to mobilize Meganisi's inhabitants (an island in the channel between Lefkada and Akarnania).<sup>38</sup>



Plan of the fortifications of Lefkada during its siege in 1807. Source: Konstantinos G. Machairas, *Πολιτική και Διπλωματική Ιστορία της Λευκάδος (1797-1810)*, Vol. 2, Athens, 1954.

38 MACHAIRAS, *Πολιτική και Διπλωματική Ιστορία της Λευκάδος (1797-1810)*, cit., Vol. 1, pp. 194-197; Nikos SVORONOS, «Εγγραφα αναφερόμενα εις τους εν Λευκάδι κλέφτας και αρματολούς», in *Επετηρίς Μεσαιωνικού Αρχείου*, 1 (1939), pp. 105-123; Spyros I. ASDRACHAS, «Αρματολοί και κλέφτες στη Λευκάδα. 14 ανέκδοτες επιστολές», in *Πρωτόγονη*

The administration of the island would also search for fugitives in the villages of the island, communicate the problem to the Turkish military commander in Corfu, or even ask the assistance of Ali Pasha himself in order to chase them and restore order. The embarrassment and the impasses it faced are evident, especially when the fugitives the government was chasing, as demanded by Ali Pasha, were welcomed back into his territories. It is quite certain that on many occasions these fugitives were connected to locals, as the vain chase of Giorgothomos proves, since he was probably connected to Andrea Trifo, Captain of one detachment of *leventi* on the island.<sup>39</sup>

Nonetheless, military forces were necessary to impose and restore internal order on the islands and their ruling classes did not fail to use them. This proved of great importance during the period 1799-1802, after the upheavals and controversy triggered by the presence of the French republicans on the islands, when local rivalries and enmities, together with widespread mobilization of the islanders claiming representation in the administration, even secessionist movements, as the one in Zante in 1801, gave ground for riots and conflicts. Moreover, the establishment of the State and its conservative Constitution, which restored the aristocratic families of the previous period to power,<sup>40</sup> triggered new riots in 1801-1802.<sup>41</sup> The situation was very fierce, as the islanders were furious with the nobles, whom they accused of bringing the Turks to the islands.<sup>42</sup>

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*Επανάσταση. Αρματολοί και κλέφτες (18ος-19ος αι.)*, Athens, Hellenic Open University, 2019, pp. 19-48.

39 MACHAIRAS, *Πολιτική και Διπλωματική Ιστορία της Λευκάδος (1797-1810)*, cit., Vol. 1, pp. 194-218, 378-398; PAPPAS, *Greeks in Russian Military service in the late 18th and early 19th centuries*, cit., pp. 168-172.

40 According to the Byzantine Constitution, as the Constitution of 1800 is known, the State was to be ruled by the *Principali* and *Notabili*. Cf. above, note 4. The second article in the Specific Constitution of each island specified that this concerned those who had acquired this status before November 1799, except for Lefkada, for which an exception was made. See NIKIFOROU (Ed.), *Συνταγματικά κείμενα των Ιονίων Νήσων*, cit., p. 384.

41 LUNZI, *Della Repubblica Settinsulare*, cit., pp. 55-74; CHIOTIS, *Ιστορία της Επτανήσου και ιδίως της Ζακύνθου από βενετοκρατίας μέχρι της ελεύσεως των Αγγλων. 1500-1816*, cit., pp. 745-799; MAVROGIANNIS, *Ιστορία των Ιονίων νήσων, 1797-1815*, cit., Vol. 1, pp. 357-369, 378-413; Eleni ANGELOMATIS-TSOUNGARAKIS, «Η ύψωση της βρετανικής σημαίας στη Ζάκυνθο το 1801 μέσα από τη βρετανική προξενική αλληλογραφία», in Despoina MICHALAGA and Panagiota MOSCHONA (Eds.), *Επτάνησος Πολιτεία 1800-1807. Μνήμη Σπύρου Δ. Λουκάτου*, Athens, Centre for the Ionian Studies, 2016, pp. 17-31.

42 KARAPIDAKIS, «Τα Επτάνησα. Ευρωπαϊκοί ανταγωνισμοί μετά την πτώση της Βενετίας»,

The episode of May 1801 in Corfu was typical of the role the Russian forces played to restore order. On May 27, the Corfu administration requested the assistance of the leaders of the Russian squadron to rescue Turkish soldiers who had clashed with the people of Corfu and to restore order. The Russian Colonel Haster took over as the temporary military commander and issued a proclamation to restore order.<sup>43</sup> Thus, it is no wonder that Spyridion Theotokis, president of the Senate, lamented over the announcement of the departure of the Russian forces, since neither were the internal affairs settled nor was the rage of the peasant restrained.<sup>44</sup>

Apart from the Russian forces, the forces of the irregular Greco Albanian troops among the local military units played an important role in suppressing these uprisings. As N. Pappas comments, the State's regular army and the *cernide* were involved in the troubles, so, when the Russian forces were absent, the only troops available to enforce order were the irregulars who had followed Ushakov's campaign and had served the Russians since 1799. The irregulars were supervised by the Russians and did not get involved with the troubles, as they served under their own leaders on whom they depended and on whose payroll they were.<sup>45</sup>

Thus, the State, although intending to organize and increase its regular forces, finally relied on the irregulars' detachments. In any case, the regular army of the State did not develop as expected for a number of reasons (lack of resources, recruitment weaknesses and turmoil on the islands). The State's regular forces remained quite limited, up to 600 men in 1803 and reaching 700 by the end of 1804. During that period, the irregulars serving on the islands were 300 men in 1798-1799 and 700 men in 1802-1803.<sup>46</sup>

Since Lefkada was, as G. Mavrogiannis commented, «the only island which was not disturbed by internal strife, as it was constantly threatened by its neighbor, the Pasha of Ioannina», the situation was handled differently on the island.<sup>47</sup>

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cit., p. 170.

43 CHIOUIS, *Ιστορία της Επτανήσου και ιδίως της Ζακύνθου από βενετοκρατίας μέχρι της ελεύσεως των Άγγλων. 1500-1816*, cit, pp. 775-777.

44 LUNZI, *Della Repubblica Settinsulare*, cit., pp. 81-82.

45 PAPPAS, *Greeks in Russian Military service in the late 18th and early 19th centuries*, cit., pp. 134-137.

46 *Ibid.*, pp. 122-124, 134-137, 144-149, 158-160, 352.

47 MAVROGIANNIS, *Ιστορία των Ιονίων νήσων, 1797-1815*, cit., Vol. 1, p. 416.

As the correspondence, during February-March 1801, between the local administration and the central administration reveals, raising the State flag was a matter that caused concern and fear, since it meant the lowering of the Russian and Turkish flags, which until then, had flown at the Castle of Santa Maura and whose sight offered the inhabitants a sense of security. Furthermore, there was a Turkish garrison on the island, while the danger of the Turkish troops on the opposite coast was always present. Besides, it was the fear of various agitators and troublemakers («ταραξίες και κακεντρεχείς»), as well as the fear of secessionist movements, such as that of Zante, that troubled both the central and the local government. Eventually, in March, the State flag was raised in a ceremony attended by both the *leventi* detachments and the *cernide*.<sup>48</sup>

In any case, it seems that in Lefkada, the local administration managed to postpone the application of the Byzantine Constitution (as the Constitution of 1800 is known) until March 1802.<sup>49</sup> The entry of new members to the Council of the island was made in November 1798 according to the proclamation of the Russian Turks, accepting members even from the second class, while new noble positions for those filling the criteria of education were announced in July 1799, in the application of the *Provisional Constitution* of Orio.<sup>50</sup>

Among the new members, there were people of aristocratic origin from Crete and Venice, who were not previously members of the island's council. One of the new members was Angelo Orio, married to a Lefkadian woman from the Servi fa-

48 MACHAIRAS, *Πολιτική και Διπλωματική Ιστορία της Λευκάδος (1797-1810)*, cit., Vol. 1, pp. 245-255. As far as the flag of the State is concerned, see Nikolaos MOSCHONAS, «Η σημαία της Επτανήσου Πολιτείας», in MICHALAGA and MOSCHONA (Eds.), *Επτάνησος Πολιτεία 1800-1807. Μνήμη Σπύρου Δ. Λουκάτου*, cit., pp. 406-419; Alikì NIKIFOROU, «Η σημαία της Επτανήσου Πολιτείας: σύμβολο ανεξαρτησίας και αναγνώρισης», in ΕΑΔΕΜ, *Επτάνησος Πολιτεία (1800-1807): τα μείζονα ιστορικά ζητήματα*, cit., pp. 117-130.

49 MACHAIRAS, *Πολιτική και Διπλωματική Ιστορία της Λευκάδος (1797-1810)*, cit., Vol. 1, pp. 159, 276. According to the proclamation of the Lefkadians in January 1802, the General Council of the island had not convened for two years. See ΛΙΑΤΑ, «Καλοί μας ομόφυλοι και γενναίοι Κερκυραίοι... Έκκληση των Λευκαδίων για συμμετοχή τους στο μεταρρυθμισμένο πολίτευμα της Επτανήσου Πολιτείας (1802)», cit., p.72: «Indipendentemente dal discorso inatacabile di diritto del Popolo, i Nobili di Santa Maura non si uni[s]cono da due anni ed un abusivo Minor Consiglio governa arbitrariamente contro la Volontà de' Sovrani, contro quello del Popolo, contro persino quella de' loro stessi Consoci, la stanca Popolazione».

50 MACHAIRAS, *Πολιτική και Διπλωματική Ιστορία της Λευκάδος (1797-1810)*, cit., Vol. 1, pp. 122-124, 144-146.



mily (a powerful family on the island) who acquired important local connections and attained considerable real estate in Lefkada, Vonitsa and Preveza.<sup>51</sup>

The opposition to the Byzantine Constitution on the island was expressed dynamically in the first semester of 1802. Large parts of the island's population protested, either by representative procedures or by resorting to arms, until the restoration of order in the summer of 1802, when the Russian army returned to the islands and Mocenigo, the Russian plenipotentiary, took control.

On January 24, 1802, the Lefkadians addressed a proclamation to the representatives of Corfu's *Onoranda Deputazione*,<sup>52</sup> in which they claimed «l'incontestabile diritto che loro deriva dalla gran Carta della Convenzione fra le Corti, la quale chiama tutte le Classi ad eleggere i loro Principali e Notabili».<sup>53</sup> Although this assertion concerned a limited right, their participation was impressive. They claimed to represent the whole population of the island, «come I Reppresentanti de' 14 mila abitanti di Santa Maura esclusi solamente gl'adetti al Governo, e chiedersi istruzioni, misure, appoggio, onde sorga per essi pure il gran giorno del Trionfo della Virtù e della Giustizia»,<sup>54</sup> a claim that was supported by an im-

51 Orio's wife, through her first marriage was connected to Patrikii, a powerful migrant family of the island, closely related to other important migrant families, such as the Peruli and Settini. Concerning the role of some of these families, see Efi ARGYROU and Sevasti LAZARI, «The military elite as factor of identity in the Ionian border between the Venetian and the Ottoman State: Lefkada, 1684-1797», *Mediterranean Chronicle*, 8 (2018), pp. 159-180; Efi ARGYROU, «Ταυτότητες-ετερότητες: η πολεμική ελίτ στη βενετική περιφέρεια, 17ος- 18ος αι. », in Gerassimos PAGRATIS (Ed.), *Πόλεμος, κράτος και κοινωνία στο Ιόνιο πέλαγος (τέλη 14ου-αρχές 19ου αιώνα)*, Athens, Herodotos, 2018, pp.425-468.

52 For the text of the *Progetto Costituzionale formato dalla Deputazione della Città, borghi e contado* of Corfu, see NIKIFOROU (Ed.), *Συνταγματικά κείμενα των Ιονίων Νήσων*, cit., pp.155-159. On the course of the events, see LUNZI, *Della Repubblica Settinsulare*, cit., pp. 86-92, 99-113; ΜΑΥΡΟΓΙΑΝΝΙΣ, *Ιστορία των Ιονίων νήσων. 1797-1815*, cit., Vol.1, pp.416-436; ΧΗΟΤΙΣ, *Ιστορία της Επτανήσου και ιδίως της Ζακύνθου από βενετοκρατίας μέχρι της ελεύσεως των Άγγλων. 1500-1816*, cit., pp. 796-805.

53 ΛΙΑΤΑ, «Καλοί μας ομόφρονι και γενναίοι Κερκυραίοι... Έκκληση των Λευκαδίων για συμμετοχή τους στο μεταρρυθμισμένο πολίτευμα της Επτανήσου Πολιτείας (1802)», cit., p. 71.

54 *Ibid.*, p. 73. According to the French census of 1798, the island's population amounted to 14.821. See GSA, AL, Θυρίς 1, No 43 (ex No 32), *Copia tratta dal Libro registro Lettere diverse 2o p. 88 della Municipalità Provvisoria di Santa Maura ed esistente nell'Archivio Pubblico di detta Città*. We come across a similar number (14.951) in 1808. See ΜΑΧΑΪΡΑΣ, *Πολιτική και Διπλωματική Ιστορία της Λευκάδος (1797-1810)*, cit., Vol. 2, pp. 650-651; Bory de SAINT VINCENT, *Nouvel Atlas pour servir à l'histoire des îles ioniennes*, Paris 1823, p. XVI.

pressive number of signatures. Eftychia Liata, comparing the signatures of the males of 15 villages with census data, concluded that in most cases over 50% of the male population took part in these proceedings.<sup>55</sup>

Although they participated in massive numbers, their policy was one of consensus rather than of subversion, assuring the ruling class that they were friends of the order: «gl'amici dell'ordine, i Padri di famiglie, i Cittadini attaccati all'amore ed al ben essere della loro Patria».<sup>56</sup>

In Corfu, the *Onoranda Deputazione* was dissolved and order was restored with the presence of English fleet troops, as the Russian one was in Naples. The ruling class of the island finally published the Firman of the Ottoman Porte which condemned the proposed innovations, revealing to the people the unified attitude of all foreign powers to restore order.<sup>57</sup>

In Lefkada, the administration succeeded in avoiding the troubles as well as the intervention of the admiral of the Turkish fleet, who arrived on the island in February.<sup>58</sup> It dealt with the armed villagers and accepted their demands: sending deputies to the protecting forces, electing a 12-member delegation which would be in consultation with them, a grant of amnesty and the release of the prisoners, election of two captains from the country and two from the villages.<sup>59</sup> However, hardly any of these claims had any results.<sup>60</sup>

Nonetheless, it took some time for order to be restored. In July 1802, the villagers of Lefkada submitted new demands for tax relief and justice: the abolition of the tobacco monopoly and of the double taxation of grain (at the threshing

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55 LIATA, «Καλοί μας ομόφυλοι και γενναίοι Κερκυραίοι... Έκκληση των Λευκαδίων για συμμετοχή τους στο μεταρρυθμισμένο πολίτευμα της Επτανήσου Πολιτείας (1802)», cit., pp.66-68.

56 *Ibid.*, pp. 72-73.

57 For Corfu, see LUNZI, *Della Repubblica Settinsulare*, cit., pp. 100-105; CHIOTIS, *Ιστορία της Επτανήσου και ιδίως της Ζακύνθου από βενετοκρατίας μέχρι της ελεύσεως των Άγγλων. 1500-1816*, cit., pp. 804-812; MAVROGIANNIS, *Ιστορία των Ιονίων νήσων. 1797-1815*, cit., Vol. 1, pp. 430-437; MACHAIRAS, *Πολιτική και Διπλωματική Ιστορία της Λευκάδος (1797-1810)*, cit., Vol. 1, pp. 300-307.

58 *Ibid.*, p. 309, note 3.

59 *Ibid.*, pp. 307-320; MAVROGIANNIS, *Ιστορία των Ιονίων νήσων. 1797-1815*, cit., Vol. 1, pp. 461-466; RONTOGIANNIS, *Ιστορία της νήσου Λευκάδος*, cit., Vol. 2, pp. 67-71.

60 See the adventures of the delegation sent to France in MAVROGIANNIS, *Ιστορία των Ιονίων νήσων. 1797-1815*, cit., Vol. 2, pp.10-12; MACHAIRAS, *Πολιτική και Διπλωματική Ιστορία της Λευκάδος (1797-1810)*, cit., Vol.1, pp.327-330.

phase and at the sale of bread); the use of the Greek language in civil and criminal courts; as well as the participation of the villagers (three from each village) in the lower courts.<sup>61</sup> These demands, which were moderate in their political character, aimed at the improvement of the system and not at its abolishment. In May 1802, the rector of Lefkada proposed the noble Constantino Metaxa as commander of the fortress of Santa Maura. He, as lieutenant colonel, would command the military forces of the island without pay, a proposal that was approved.<sup>62</sup>

It was worth pointing out the strengths and the weaknesses of the negotiations exerted by the villagers of the island, who, armed, were ready to defend the island and to assert civil rights. However, the international situation was not favorable for claims of this kind and order was finally restored on the islands by the return of the Russian fleet in the summer of 1802 and of Mocenigo, the Russian plenipotentiary. Their return, approved of by the French, aimed at the restoration of order on the islands, but it was also used by the French to counterbalance the presence of the British in the area.

As order was restored, General Councils were elected on the basis of the provisions of the Byzantine Constitution. In Lefkada (March 1802), despite the fear of rebellious villagers, the General Council of the island, consisting of 270 members, was elected by the prominent families of the island. This Council elected the island's representatives to the Senate and its judicial and administrative authorities.<sup>63</sup>

The structure of the military forces of the island during this turbulent period is revealed by the budget planning (1/4/1802 – 31/3/1803) and expenses (27/3/1802 – 7/10/1802) accounts (Table III). According to them, the defense of the island was maintained by 6 companies each comprising 17 *levanti* under 1 captain,<sup>64</sup> by an artillery force and by 2 villagers' companies each comprising 20 *levanti* under its own captain, serving on rotation. Commander of the castle was Captain Nicola Paleologo, who was on the island from the time of the arrival of the Russian

61 RONTOGIANNIS, *Ιστορία της νήσου Λευκάδος*, cit., Vol. 2, pp. 76-78.

62 MACHAIRAS, *Πολιτική και Διπλωματική Ιστορία της Λευκάδος (1797-1810)*, cit., Vol. 1, p. 327.

63 *Ibid.*, pp. 313-322.

64 PAPPAS, *Greeks in Russian Military service in the late 18th and early 19th centuries*, cit., p. 148, mentions that in 1803 irregular forces amounting to 100 men were placed on each of the main islands (Corfu, Cephalonia, Lefkada, Zante) and detachments of 30-50 men on the smaller ones (Kythira [Cerigo], Paxoi, Ithaca). As such, over 700 irregular troops served in the Republic. See, also, *Ibid.*, p. 352.

Turks. The auxiliary role of the *cernide* service was maintained.

It is probable that the two above mentioned companies of villagers' *leventi* serving on rotation were those rebel villagers at arms, whom the central government had tried to abolish.<sup>65</sup> If so, their disarmament was realized in October 1802 on the arrival of the island's new governor, Annino. The new governor, accompanied by 36 Russian soldiers, demanded their disarmament, since they were no longer necessary for the defense of the island, a task undertaken by the Russian garrison. However, it seems that the *cernide* continued their service.<sup>66</sup>

According to the budget planning for the period (1/4/1802 – 31/3/1803), the military expenses amounted to 61,61% of the total revenue, of which 38,17% were budgeted for the 6 companies of *leventi*. When the new governor arrived, 76,40% of the respective planned expenses had already been utilized.

Military expenses, together with the vassalage tax of 75.000 piastres owed by the Republic to the Ottoman State for three years, rendered its financial situation quite precarious.<sup>67</sup> According to various estimations, military expenses of the Republic rose to 13.000 or 17.000 thalers per month.<sup>68</sup> In order to level its budget, in November 1802, the Republic appealed to the patriotic feelings of the islanders and proclaimed a personal contribution (*capitazione*) of 120.000 thalers on all of the Islands, of which 18.000 was to be collected from Lefkada. Imposed on every male over 12, this contribution gave a revenue of 112.000 thalers with a surplus of 6.247.<sup>69</sup> The budget planning for the year 1804 was 300.000 thalers, while the expenses were higher, 363.000 thalers. Military expenses consumed a

65 Already on 19/3/1802 (old calendar), the Prime Minister of the Republic, in concordance with the local government, proposed the dismissal of the villagers' two companies. ΜΑΧΗΑΙΡΑΣ, *Πολιτική και Διπλωματική Ιστορία της Λευκάδος (1797-1810)*, cit., Vol. 1, pp. 320-322.

66 *Ibid.*, pp. 340-345.

67 Sevasti LAZARI, «Οικονομικές αλλαγές και προσαρμογές στην Επτάνησο Πολιτεία 1800-1807), in *Πρακτικά Κ' Συμποσίου. Αλλαγές κυριαρχιών, ρήξεις και νέοι θεσμοί στα Επτάνησα από το 1797 έως το 1815*, Athens, Society for Lefkadian Studies, 2016, pp. 61-80.

68 Andreas M. ANDREADIS, *Η Επτανησιακή δημόσια οικονομία κατά την περίοδο 1797-1814*, Corfu, 1936, p. 30. The first estimation comes from ΜΑΥΡΟΓΙΑΝΝΙΣ, *Ιστορία των Ιονίων νήσων. 1797-1815*, cit., Vol. 2, p. 33, while the second from ΧΙΟΤΙΣ, *Ιστορία της Επτανήσου και ιδίως της Ζακύνθου από βενετοκρατίας μέχρι της ελεύσεως των Άγγλων. 1500-1816*, cit., p. 816 and LUNZI, *Della Repubblica Settinsulare*, cit., p. 126.

69 ANDREADIS, *Η Επτανησιακή δημόσια οικονομία κατά την περίοδο 1797-1814*, cit., pp. 31-32; ΜΑΧΗΑΙΡΑΣ, *Πολιτική και Διπλωματική Ιστορία της Λευκάδος (1797-1810)*, cit., Vol. 1, pp.345-350; ΜΑΥΡΟΓΙΑΝΝΙΣ, *Ιστορία των Ιονίων νήσων. 1797-1815*, cit., Vol. 2, pp. 31-32.

large amount of the State's budget, estimated to be 242.000 thalers. Half of it, 136.156 thalers (56,26%), was meant for the Russian forces and the rest for the local military forces.<sup>70</sup> So, the State appealed to the Russian emperor to assume the expenses of the Russian army to lift this burden.<sup>71</sup>

The increasing military expenses were due to the rising number of the Russian military forces during that period. In late 1803, the Russian military forces consisted of 1.200 troops and 2 war ships. The Russians considered the expansion of the French army in Italy to be an eminent danger for the islands, so they increased their troops. By the end of 1805, the Russian forces numbered 12.000 men and 39 vessels.<sup>72</sup>

From August 1802 to July 1807, the Republic enjoyed a short period of peace and security, during which considerable administrative and legislative work was done. The Constitution of December 1803 strengthened the central power, the "unitary state", limiting the power of the local governments, as it had been under the previous system. In contrast to the conservative provisions of the Byzantine constitution, the number of active citizens was increased by granting political rights to qualified people and constitutional nobility instead of hereditary nobility. From August 1803 to July 1804, the electoral list in Lefkada was increased to 329 people, permitting a slightly broader representation, in comparison to the 260 members at the end of the Venetian period.<sup>73</sup>

The provisions of the Constitution enshrined individual rights (property, residential asylum, etc.) and legislated rules of law and justice. In addition, it required the use of the Greek language as a prerequisite for occupying an administrative position commencing from 1810.<sup>74</sup> As we have seen in the aforementioned

<sup>70</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 95-97.

<sup>71</sup> ΧΙΟΤΙΣ, *Ιστορία της Επτανήσου και ιδίως της Ζακύνθου από βενετοκρατίας μέχρι της ελεύσεως των Άγγλων. 1500-1816*, cit., pp. 855-856 mentions the request of the State to the Russian emperor to pay out 90.000 thalers per year for the maintenance of the Russian army.

<sup>72</sup> ΡΑΠΠΑΣ, *Greeks in Russian Military service in the late 18th and early 19th centuries*, cit. pp. 151 -154.

<sup>73</sup> ΜΑΧΑΪΡΑΣ, *Πολιτική και Διπλωματική Ιστορία της Λευκάδος (1797-1810)*, cit., Vol. 1, pp. 123 note 1, 352-353, 362-369; and Vol. 2, p. 411.

<sup>74</sup> ΝΙΚΙΦΟΡΟΥ (Ed.), *Συνταγματικά κείμενα των Ιονίων Νήσων*, cit., pp. 454-460 (articles 143-192 concerning the organization of Justice and the courts), 462 (article 211 concerning the use of the Greek language). Spyros Logothetis, an affluent Lefkadian, acknowledged the benefits of the use of the Greek language in courts as well as an element of identity, that of *Γένος Ρωμαϊκόν*: «ετούτη η Πολιτεία μας είναι συνθεμένη από Γένος Ρωμαϊκόν [...]

demands of the peasants of Lefkada, this last provision was one of the main demands of the lower classes. The State accomplished a great task in the commercial sector, by instituting new regulations and organizing its consulates.<sup>75</sup>

Apart from civil organization, Mocenigo devoted himself to the organization and expansion of the State's army. Although the main goal of the State was to increase its regular army (approximately 600-700 men in 1803-1804), this process was quite slow. As we have noticed before, during this period, the regular army force was equal to the irregulars. From 1803 onwards, Mocenigo tried to organize and restructure the military forces of the Republic. In the legislation passed in March 1804, the State planned to increase its terrestrial military force to 2.000 men, while its army consisted of 700 men (*truppa regolata*), 500 *Macedoni* and 7 vessels.<sup>76</sup>

However, due to the existence of a large number of Souliotes on the islands after the fall of Souli (December 1803) and because of the decision taken by Russians to reinforce the armed forces on the islands so as to protect them from the French, a *Legion of Light Riflemen* was formed. By the end of 1805, this legion consisted of 1.964 men, 1.354 of whom were Souliotes, Roumeliotes and Epirotes, 359 Himariotes, and 251 from the Peloponnese and Mani. By 1807, there were 2.340 legionnaires in service.<sup>77</sup>

In order to ensure the security of the islands, Mocenigo tried to promote universal recruitment by organizing the *Truppa Civica*, which was to replace the limited force of *cernide*. However, this plan met the fervent opposition of the

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είναι αναγκαϊότατον [...] να μην γράφεται και να μην ομιλείται πλέον η Ιταλική γλώσσα εις τα Κριτήριά μας». Triandafylos E. SKLAVENITIS, «Η ανάδυση της επανησιακής ιστορικής ταυτότητας και των νησιωτικών ιστορικών τοπικοτήτων», in *Πρακτικά ΙΘ' Συνεδρίου. Πολιτισμικές εκφράσεις της επανησιακής ταυτότητας 17ος-20ος αι.*, Athens, Society for Lefkadian Studies, 2015, pp.158-159.

75 Gerassimos D. PAGRATIS, «Εμπόριο και ναυτιλία στα νησιά του Ιονίου Πελάγους στα χρόνια της Επτανήσου Πολιτείας», in Gelina HARLAFTIS and Katerina PΑΡΑΚΟΝΣΤΑΝΤΙΝΟΥ (Eds.), *Η ναυτιλία των Ελλήνων 1700-1821. Ο αιώνας της ακμής πριν από την Επανάσταση*, Athens, Ionian University – Kedros Publishers, 2013, pp. 631-649.

76 According to the *Legge Organica della Forza Armata della Repubblica* (March 1804). See Nikos E. KOURKOUMELIS, «Δομή και οργάνωση των στρατιωτικών δυνάμεων της Επτανήσου Πολιτείας», in MICHALAGA and MOSCHONA (Eds.), *Επτάνησος Πολιτεία 1800-1807. Μνήμη Σπύρου Δ. Λουκάτου*, cit., pp. 268-273; PAPPAS, *Greeks in Russian Military service in the late 18th and early 19th centuries*, cit., pp. 158-160.

77 *Ibid.*, pp. 150, 179-217, 352. In the appendixes X, XI, XII (*Ibid.*, pp. 347-352) the author lists the names of *Kleftes* and *armatoloi* operating on the Ionian Islands during that period.





Fortino or Konstantino. Source: <https://1821.lefkasculturalcenter.gr/>.

Nobles of the islands,<sup>78</sup> so it was only in April 1805 that the *Regolamento Organico della Truppa Civica ossia delle Cernide della Reppublica Settinsulare* was published. According to this, the *Truppa Civica* was supposed to reach 12.000 men on the islands with the recruitment of all males 16-60.<sup>79</sup> Initially, it consisted of 4.000 and by 1807 it reached 7.000.<sup>80</sup>

The task of organizing and training the State's military forces was finally assigned to Emmanuel Papadopoulo, a Russian officer of Greek origin. In 1804, he was put in command of the regular forces of the Republic, and in 1805, of the irregular forces. He compiled a military manual, the so-called *Διδασκαλία στρατιωτική προς χρήσιν των Ελλήνων* (1804), and published a regulation entitled *Ερμηνεία της συνισταμένης Λεγεώνας των Ηπειροτο-Σουλιωτών και Χιμαρο-Πελοποννησίων* (1805).<sup>81</sup>

78 ΜΑΥΡΟΓΙΑΝΝΙΣ, *Ιστορία των Ιονίων νήσων. 1797-1815*, cit., Vol.2, pp. 98-99.

79 ΚΟΥΡΚΟΥΜΕΛΙΣ, «Δομή και οργάνωση των στρατιωτικών δυνάμεων της Επτανήσου Πολιτείας», cit., pp. 248-263.

80 PAPPAS, *Greeks in Russian Military service in the late 18th and early 19th centuries*, cit., p. 160.

81 *Ibid.*, pp. 159, 190-191. The Russian Colonel Al. Benkendorf played an important role in the organization of the Souliote and the Himariote legions on the islands. Papadopoulo served as his assistant in the formation and command of the Souliote Legion.

The enlistment list from Lefkada (Table VI) comprised 2.688 men (active and reserve), a body much larger in size than the local militia of *cernide* of the Venetian period (about 400 men). If compared to available census data, they constituted 77,09% of the adult males on the island in 1760 and 64,05% of it in 1788, or respectively about 23,61% and 20,52% of the general population, varying from one village to another (Table VII).<sup>82</sup> In terms of organization, they consisted of two legions divided into corps of 50, each of them consisting of smaller groups of tens.

According to their regulation, men on the islands were required to practice the rules of discipline and military in order to form a strong force of natives that could defend the State («le cernide attivi sono tenuti a prendere le armi in difesa del loro paese, dei loro focolari, delle loro famiglie e del Governo loro»);<sup>83</sup> «an institution practiced in all developed States», as the governor of Lefkada proclaimed to all the Lefkadians in May 1805.<sup>84</sup>

This universal recruitment was meant to replace the institution of the *cernide* after a transitional period. So, in Lefkada, in the accounts of the expenses of 1806 (March-August), we come across the payment of six months' wages to the superintendent of the *cernide*, L. Aleandri, to his adjutant Spiridion Vasilaki, but also to the captains and the adjutants of the two legions of the *Truppa Civica* of the island.

According to the above accounts of expenses, apart from this local force, the defense of the island depended on the Russian garrison under Zangel and on the *Corpo Macedone*. From the amount of the wages paid (Tables IV, V), it seems that

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82 According to the French census of 1798, the island's population was estimated at 14.821 inhabitants. As the adult male population of this census is unknown, we made use of the censuses of 1760 and 1788. According to the census of 1760, males of 16-60 amounted to 3.487 and constituted 30, 63% of the total population (11.386). Sevasti LAZARI, «Δημογραφικές πληροφορίες για τη Λευκάδα (1760, 1788, 1824)», in *Πρακτικά Δ' Συνεδρίου Επτανησιακού πολιτισμού. Από την τοπική ιστορία στη συνολική. Το παράδειγμα της Λευκάδας, 15ος-19ος αι.*, Athens, 1996, p. 231. In 1788, males of 14-60 were 4.197 and constituted 32, 04% of the total population (13.099). ΛΙΑΤΑ, «Καλοί μας ομόφυλοι και γενναίοι Κερκυραίοι... Έκκληση των Λευκαδίων για συμμετοχή τους στο μεταρρυθμισμένο πολίτευμα της Επτανήσου Πολιτείας (1802), cit., pp. 76-77.

83 KOURKOUHELIS, «Δομή και οργάνωση των στρατιωτικών δυνάμεων της Επτανήσου Πολιτείας», cit., p.251.

84 MACHAIRAS, *Πολιτική και Διπλωματική Ιστορία της Λευκάδος (1797-1810)*, cit., Vol. 2, pp. 460-462.

from March until half of June, a unit of *Corpo Macedone* under Captain Christo Thoma, consisting of 4 sergeants, 4 corporals and 77 soldiers, served on the island, while, from June to September Captain Draco Grivas' unit served, consisting of 4 officers, 4 sergeants, 4 corporals and 68 soldiers.<sup>85</sup> This unit, under Captain Grivas' command, was in service when Ali Pasha started his siege of the island.

From the expenses incurred during this period, it is clear that the Russian army tried to strengthen the defense of the island. As the international environment changed, in October 1806, Ali Pasha grabbed the opportunity and started to gather his troops opposite the island obstructing its trade. By the end of the year, the Ottoman Empire declared war on Russia and consequently it became impossible for the State to avoid being involved. Finally, by the summer of 1807, the State abandoned its neutral policy, sided with Russia and entered the war against France.

The entire military force of the State participated in its defense from October 1806 to July 1807 (Treaty of Tilsit). In this military operation, corps of the Russian army, the Greek military corps under Russian service, forces of the Ionian militia, but also irregulars (*Kleftes* and *armatoloi* from the mainland, fighting at the rear of Ali Pasha's forces) participated. Apart from them, a significant number of workers from all the islands worked in its fortifications and defense works.<sup>86</sup> During the skirmishes, the Greek soldiers in the service of the State fought against the Greeks serving in the French corps allied with Ali Pasha.

The Russian Colonel Zangel was in command for the defense of the island until November 1806. Under his orders and those of the island's administration, a number of men of *Truppa Civica* were called to service as early as October 1806. In October 1806, some of them were recruited by civilians and some others by the *cernide's* superintendent Lorenzo Aleandri. Although in the beginning the gov-

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85 See the different names under which the irregulars were known over the years in PAPPAS, *Greeks in Russian Military service in the late 18th and early 19th centuries*, cit., p. 146. He also mentions that the Macedonian Corps was not concentrated on any one island but was periodically assigned to different islands. From September 1805, the force of this corps was reduced, so that each of its companies did not exceed 89 men, while before they numbered 115. *Ibid.*, pp. 160-162.

86 See the number of the workers of each island in Spyridon D. LOUKATOS, *Ο Ιωάννης Καποδίστριας και η Επτάνησος Πολιτεία*, Athens, 1959, pp. 123-124 (Santa Maura's journal of the July 1st, 1807); MACHAIRAS, *Πολιτική και Διπλωματική Ιστορία της Λευκάδος (1797-1810)*, cit., Vol. 2, p. 552.

ernment of the island refused to follow the Russian commander's advice to pay them, it seems that, on certain occasions, there was some sort of payment. In any case, the government tried to avoid paying and appealed to the patriotic feelings of the locals. At the same time, it tried to avoid calling villagers to service, as it seems it was still afraid that the villagers would take control. Their duties were to guard posts at the coastal sites of the island, sometimes replacing paid soldiers, and so saving money as they did when they replaced a number of Epirote soldiers.<sup>87</sup> The Russian reinforcement, which included units of the Russian army and sections of the Legion of the Light Riflemen, started arriving on the island from November, and were placed under the general command of the Russian Major General I. Stadter.

As the attack was expected on the eastern part of the island, it was of top priority to strengthen the line of defense in the channel. The defense consisted of the fortification of certain holding sites in the channel, Alexandro, Fortino (Konstantino),<sup>88</sup> and Koula between the Castle and Teke, as well as four sites for canons on Gyra. In February 1806, the State even discussed undertaking a major task, the dredging of the channel between the island and Akarnania in order to facilitate shipping and to protect the island from the attacks of Ali Pasha. However, the excessive cost of the task and the difficulties to execute it in conditions of war did not permit its implementation.<sup>89</sup> In March 1807, when the enemy's attacks intensified, Stadter ordered the construction of a trench («χαντάκι») from Gyra to Kato Alykes to protect the city.<sup>90</sup> In June, Michaud, the French engineer who came together with Ioannis Kapodistrias, advised to abandon the fort Alexandro, which was exposed to Ali Pasha's cannonade and to construct an entrenchment between the two forts, Konstantino and Alexandro.<sup>91</sup> These tasks demanded an increased number of workers, whom the other islands willingly provided, even undertaking the expenses.<sup>92</sup>

87 *Ibid.*, pp. 498-512, 539-540.

88 Alexandro was a new fort inaugurated in January 1807, named after the emperor of Russia. Correspondingly Fortino, the old fort, was named Konstantino after the successor of the throne. *Ibid.*, p.528.

89 *Ibid.*, pp. 477-480.

90 *Ibid.*, pp. 534-535.

91 *Ibid.*, pp. 550-554. As Kapodistrias stated in his report of August 1807, this *trincieramento* was not completed. *Ibid.*, p. 586.

92 *Ibid.*, p. 552. ΛΟΥΚΑΤΟΣ, *Ο Ιωάννης Καποδίστριας και η Επανάσταση Πολιτεία*, cit., pp. 123-124.

As far as Ali Pasha was concerned, he utilized the French's experience of fortification works as well as the military experience of the Greek corps *Chasseurs d'Orient*, commanded by the well-known Greek officer Nikolaos Papazoglou.<sup>93</sup> His forces fortified and reinforced the positions of St. George and Kastri, opposite the fort of Alexandro, and Teke, opposite Koula and the Castle. This line of attack blocked the movement in the channel and cut off the island. At the end of March 1807, they stopped the attack driven by the Russian general Stadter.<sup>94</sup>

This failure created friction between the Russian general and the rector of the island, Stelio Vlassopoulo. As a result, the State appointed Ioannis Kapodistrias, as *Commissario Estraordinario*. Kapodistrias arrived on the island at the end of May. Soon after, Emmanuel Papadopoulo arrived as general commander of the army, as the irregular corps had outnumbered the Russian regulars. The former bishop of Arta and Nafpaktos, Ignatios, was also put in charge of a corps of kleftes and Souliotes. Kapodistrias undertook the coordination of the island's defense as well as its financial management,<sup>95</sup> a matter to which he gave a lot of attention and which, among other things, became a major point of disagreement with Stelio Vlassopoulo who finally resigned.<sup>96</sup>

Kapodistrias also organized a volunteer flotilla and had close relations with *kleftes* and *armatoloi* from the mainland who were harassing Ali Pasha's forces at the rear.

The impact of the war on the islanders is brilliantly presented in the letters of Anna Giourga Settini. From her correspondence, we get a clear picture of the entrance of ordinary people into the forefront of war events. She, a woman of the upper class, was fully informed of the evolution of the war, as a lot of information she mentioned matches the information given in the first edition of the local newspaper *Santa Maura*.<sup>97</sup> She noted the fact that all the people of the island took

93 Leonidas KALLIVRETAKIS, «Ενοπλα Ελληνικά σώματα στη δίνη των Ναπολεόντειων πολέμων (1798-1815)», in Vassilis Panagiotopoulos (Ed.), *Ιστορία του Νέου Ελληνισμού*, Athens, Ellinika Grammata, Vol. 1, 2003, pp. 187-189.

94 MACHAIRAS, *Πολιτική και Διπλωματική Ιστορία της Λευκάδος (1797-1810)*, cit., Vol. 2, pp. 528-534, 536-539.

95 *Ibid.*, pp. 547-550.

96 *Ibid.*, pp. 553-554, 566-568. See the judgemental comments of Anna Giourga Settini about Vlassopoulo in RONTOGIANNIS, *Ιστορία της νήσου Λευκάδος*, cit., Vol. 2, pp. 186 (Anna Giourga Settini's letter of 28/5/1807), 196 (letter of 2/7/1807).

97 SKLAVENITIS, «Ιδεολογικές ανατροπές και συνθέσεις», cit., pp. 58-60.



up arms, willing to sacrifice their lives for their *πατρίδα* (homeland) and for their *γένος*. Though she considered *γένος* in its traditional meaning, probably as *Ρωμαϊκόν γένος*, homeland included Ionian and certainly the Septinsular Republic: «το θέατρον της επτανήσου πολιτείας εκαταστήθη η πατρίδα μας και της μέλει να υποφέρει όλες τες δυστυχίες, και συμφοράς, εδώ συναθροίζονται τα Ιωνικά άρματα και καθημερινώς φθάνουν βοήθειες από τα άλλα Νησιά».<sup>98</sup>

However, people's willingness to sacrifice their lives did not mean that they were not afraid or did not lose their courage occasionally, as we derive from her comment on how the arrival of Emmanuel Papadopoulo lifted their moral.<sup>99</sup> Nonetheless, there were some Lekfadians who had a different attitude concerning this important issue. As early as October 1806, a number of wealthy people had already left the island with all their riches.<sup>100</sup> As far as Anna Giourga Settini was concerned, she sympathized with the people at arms and was ready to sacrifice her life, desiring to follow the example of her compatriots.<sup>101</sup>

But it was not easy for the people in power to recognize these kinds of virtues in ordinary people. As we have seen, universal recruitment was the subject of controversy in the State Senate sessions in 1803. Mocenigo hurled disparaging remarks about the defense workers in Lefkada, who, frightened by the cannonade

98 RONTOGIANNIS, *Ιστορία της νήσου Λευκάδος*, cit., Vol. 2, p. 195 (letter of 2/7/1807); ARVANITAKIS, «Οι επιστολές του 1807: Πού τέμνεται ο λόγος της Ιστοριογραφίας με το λόγο των τεκμηρίων;», cit., pp. 127-156; IDEM, «Η πατρίδα, οι πολίτες και οι πατριώτες», cit., pp. 132-136.

99 RONTOGIANNIS, *Ιστορία της νήσου Λευκάδος*, cit., Vol. 2, p. 195 (letter of 2/7/1807): «τα βήματα της πατρίδος μας διά το παρόν είναι εις κάποιαν ησυχίαν και μάλιστα οι εγκάτοικοι εμπυχώθησαν και ανδρίευσαν έπειτα της απολαύσεως (;) του γκενεράλ Παπαδόπουλου, όστις άρχισε να βάνει τα πράγματα εν τάξει».

100 See the report (28/10/1806) of the island's rector, Stelio Vlassopoulo, in MACHAIRAS, *Πολιτική και Διπλωματική Ιστορία της Λευκάδος (1797-1810)*, cit., Vol. 2, pp. 505-506: «Κατέστησα ήδη γνωστός προς τας Υμετέρας Εξοχότητας τους φόβους και τρόμους των Λευκαδίων, επαυξάνοντας κατόπιν των τελευταίων ειδήσεων, ως είναι εκείναι, αίτινες περιέχονται εν τω ως άνω εγγράφω του προξένου Ζαμπέλη. Ο φόβος ηνάγκασε τινάς των Λευκαδίων να ζητήσουν διαβατήρια, ίνα μεταβούν αλλαχού και άλλους να επιβιβάσουν τα τιμαλφή των αντικείμενα επί λέμβων επί τούτω ναυλωθεισών. Πάντα ταύτα πανικοβάλλουν τον πληθυσμόν».

101 RONTOGIANNIS, *Ιστορία της νήσου Λευκάδος*, cit., Vol. 2, pp.195-196, letter of 2/7/1807: «απεφάσισα να γένω θυσία ομού με τόσους άλλους συναδέλφους μας [...] εάν είναι απόφαση να καθή η πατρίς, με τόσες χιλιάδες ψυχές, και μάλιστα τώρα εις τον τρόπον οπου εδυναμώθη, και διαφεντεύεται από τα ανίκητα και ποικίλα άρματα, θέλει υποφέρω μαζί μετ' αυτους το αποβησόμενο της τύχης τους».





Alexandro. Source: <https://1821.lefkasculturalcenter.gr/>.

of Ali Pasha and his French allies, abandoned their posts. In his report, Kapodistrias acknowledged the fear the workers felt and did his best to persuade them to go back to work. He, the prelates, the priests and various noblemen from Corfu stood their ground and, by their personal example, showed them that there was no danger from the cannonade, thus persuading them to return to their posts to work during the night.<sup>102</sup> Kapodistrias' persistence concerning the issue forced Mocenigo to recant.<sup>103</sup>

In his well-known memorandum (6/8/1807), shortly after the surrender of the islands to France,<sup>104</sup> Kapodistrias presented a number of proposals to the island's

102 MACHAIRAS, *Πολιτική και Διπλωματική Ιστορία της Λευκάδος (1797-1810)*, cit., Vol. 2, pp. 550-551.

103 *Ibid.*, pp. 552-553 (Kapodistrias' response to Mocenigo). As for the response of Mocenigo, see Ermanno LUNZI, *Della Repubblica Settinsulare*, cit., p. 218.

104 GSA, AL, Αρχαιοθήκη Αρχαιοφυλακείου (1569-1962), Φάκ. 8, *Δράσις Ιωάννου Καποδιστρίου εν Λευκάδι* (hereafter: Kapodistrias' report), fols. 79r-85v. Cf. MACHAIRAS, *Πολιτική και Διπλωματική Ιστορία της Λευκάδος (1797-1810)*, cit., Vol. 2, pp. 579-595 (Greek translation).

government. It is very important to notice the way he approached the people and the Greek soldiers who took part in the siege. He stated that the auxiliary foreign forces who secured the safety of the island were not sufficient. So, he proposed that the administration of the island should maintain its people at arms and its *truppa civica* on call. «Le truppe straniere ausiliarie sole non bastano per coprire in tutta la sua estesa la linea di difesa di quest'isola; [...] il Governo dunque deve volere costantemente che la Guardia Nazionale sia in grande attività di servizio [...] i quelli [i paesani] costituiscano realmente la forza viva della Guardia Nazionale troveranno in questa associazione colla Nobiltà quanto vale [...]».<sup>105</sup>

Together with some other members of the upper classes of the islands, he also acknowledged the contribution of *kleftes* and *armatoloi*, not only for the defense of the island, but also for the maintenance of its supplies, since they had ensured the supply of goods from the mainland during the siege.<sup>106</sup> Consequently, *kleftes* and *armatoloi* were no longer considered a source of concern for the State and the island,<sup>107</sup> but brave defenders. Anna Giourga Settini named Katsantoni a brave man («ανδρείο»),<sup>108</sup> and, in the island's journal, the *kleftes* and *armatoloi* were described as the future hope of the freedom.<sup>109</sup>

Kapodistrias asserted that military issues should be dealt with as they affected the safety of the island. So, in the period before the arrival of the French troops, it was of great importance that the island's administration and its people offered the *kleftes* and *armatoloi* asylum, hospitality and supplies.<sup>110</sup>

105 Kapodistrias' report, fols. 82v-83r. Cf. MACHAIRAS, *Πολιτική και Διπλωματική Ιστορία της Λευκάδος (1797-1810)*, cit., Vol. 2, pp. 588-589.

106 *Ibid.*, p. 563; RONGOIANNIS, *Ιστορία της νήσου Λευκάδος*, cit., Vol. 2, p. 187 (in Anna Giourga Settini's letter, 28/5/1807).

107 Kapodistrias' report, fol. 80r: «I volontari Armatolò intitolati Ladri furono mai sempre il soggetto della inquietudine di Santa Maura, ed il pretesto delle persecuzioni del Vezire di Giannina in verso di noi. Questi bravi uomini vittime della loro educazione, e delle circostanze hanno reso alla Repubblica segnalati ed essenziali servizi durante la Guerra. Essi vi hanno provveduto degli ozzetii i più importanti della subsistenza [...]». MACHAIRAS, *Πολιτική και Διπλωματική Ιστορία της Λευκάδος (1797-1810)*, cit., Vol. 2, p. 582.

108 RONGOIANNIS, *Ιστορία της νήσου Λευκάδος*, cit., Vol. 2, p. 191 (Anna Giourga Settini's letter, 13/6/1807).

109 LOUKATOS, *Ο Ιωάννης Καποδίστριας και η Επτάνησος Πολιτεία*, cit., pp. 122-123. As stated in Santa Maura's journal (1/7/1807), «οι αρματολοί απέκτησαν τοιαύτην αυθάδειαν και θάρρος οπού είναι όλη η καλή ελπίς με το απέρασμα του καιρού να κάμουν και μεγαλύτερα προχωρήματα και κινήματα πλέον τακτικά και επωφελή».

110 Kapodistrias' report, fols. 80r-81v. Cf. MACHAIRAS, *Πολιτική και Διπλωματική Ιστορία της*

As for the Greeks serving in the Russian forces, the island's *ex commissario straordinario* proposed the raising of funds for them,<sup>111</sup> as dismantling soldiers was a delicate matter and it was important that the State take care of them until a more permanent solution was found. As a matter of fact, most of these soldiers were hired by the French.<sup>112</sup> Since the French were to be responsible for the island's defense, he advised the island's administration to provide for the quartering of the incoming French troops. It seems that this proposal was necessary, because this matter caused friction with the local population considering the burden it would place upon them.<sup>113</sup>

In any case, Kapodistrias proved his ideas to be correct by connecting and uniting the leaders, the chiefs and the people at the "famous banquets" he organized for all troops' leaders and chiefs of administration at Halikiopoulo's and Magemeno which were also open to the public.<sup>114</sup>

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*Λευκάδος (1797-1810)*, cit., Vol. 2, pp. 582-584.

111 Kapodistrias' report, fols. 80v-81r. Cf. MACHAIRAS, *Πολιτική και Διπλωματική Ιστορία της Λευκάδος (1797-1810)*, cit., Vol. 2, p. 584.

112 KALLIVRETAKIS, «Ενοπλα Ελληνικά σώματα στη δίνη των Ναπολεόντειων πολέμων (1798-1815)», cit., pp. 191-195; PAPPAS, *Greeks in Russian Military service in the late 18th and early 19th centuries*, cit. pp. 259-270.

113 RONTOGIANNIS, *Ιστορία της νήσου Λευκάδος*, cit., Vol. 2, pp. 193-194 (letter of a Lefkadian woman, 30/6/1807): «Βρίσκεται εις το σπίτι μου ο κουμαντάντες Πιέρης με αδελφό του και κουνιάδο του και με αγιουτάντε μπατάλια με τρεις ορδινάντζες και με την κομπανία του. Μου οκουπάραν το απάνου σπίτι και την μια κάμαρα. Εμαράθηκα διά ανάπανη μέρα και νύχτα μα δεν την έχω. [...] η φαμελιά του Χαλικιόπουλου ευρίσκεται εις το Αθάνι, έξω από το δετόρο Μάρκο, η φαμελιά του Πάνου Μαρίνου ευρίσκεται εις Αι Πέτρο, μα εις τα σπίτια τους δεν εβάλαν κανένε. Μόνον εμένα εγνώρισε η κομισιόν αρκετή να δουλεύω την πατρίδα χωρίς νοίκι».

114 *Ibid.*, pp. 195-196 (in Anna Giourga Settini's letter, 2/7/1807): «[...] αυτός ο χρήσιμος νέος [Καποδίστριας] έδωσε την απερασμένη Κυριακή ένα γιόμα πλουσιοπάροχο, εις το οποίον εσυ(νά)χθησαν γκενεραλέοι με όλην τους τρι οφικιαλιτά, διάφορες αρχόντισσες, οφικιαλιτά της θαλάσσης, Μητροπολιτάδες, τα γραϊκά καπετανάτα, οι προεστάτες της πολιτείας, και πολλοί άλλοι, τον αριθμό 120. Και αυτό το γεύμα έγινε διά την ευρωχώρα της τάβλας, μέσα εις το περιβόλι του δοτ. Χαλικιόπουλου εις άγιον Δημήτριο, οπού εκρατούσε από το ένα μέρος, εις το άλλο, με άδειαν όσοι ήθελαν να παγαίνουν εις θεώρησιν και οπού το κονκόρσο ήταν μεγαλότατα συντροφευμένο με τα λαλούμενα τα Ιωνικά και ρουσιτικά». *Ibid.*, pp. 181-182. Kapodistrias' report (8/7/1807): «Ο σεβασμιώτατος Ιγνάτιος, [...] επήγε στην εξοχή στη θέση που λέγεται Μαγεμένο, και κατασκήνωσε κάτω από τα δένδρα των κήπων που είναι εκεί, ανάμεσα στους ανδρείους οπαδούς του, που ξεπερνούσαν τους 400. [...] Καθισμένοι κάτω από την πλατειά σκιά μιας φουντωμένης καρδιάς, ο σεβασμιώτατος Ιγνάτιος, ο στρατηγός Παπαδόπουλος κι εγώ, περιτριγυριστήκαμε από τους Έλληνες καπεταναίους, και μάλιστα από το συνετό και ανδρείο Μπότσαρη, το φο-

In this essay, we tried to discuss the effects that the permanent threat of war had on the Lefkadians' lives as well as the choices they made: the way they participated in the discussions about the future of the Septinsular Republic, the way they claimed civil rights and the way the ruling class of the island evaded them. Lefkadians were ready, in many cases, to take up arms and participate in the military actions of the period. The exact number of men of the local *cernide* is not mentioned, but we know that they were constantly called to chase fugitives from the mainland, an obligation the State had undertaken. The other military forces serving on the island also helped them in this pursuit. The 1806's six months accounts, in which the *cernide* coexist with the new institution of *Truppa Civica* (based on universal recruitment) reveal the transitional period to implement this new institution. In the enlistment list of the island, recruitment constituted of a large number of males 16-60. Nevertheless, universal recruitment was not accepted by all of the upper class. Although in October 1806 the governors of the island accepted *cernide* from the surrounding areas to serve in the siege of the island, they tried to avoid utilizing armed people from villages. For Kapodistrias, the defense of the homeland should depend on its people to form the *Truppa Civica*, commanded by the nobles.

A large amount of the island's expenses was spent on the detachments of irregulars who served on the island, under local leaders. Since most of the *levanti* detachments of irregulars serving must have been Lefkadians, the local government was always fearful of the armed villagers and with good reason. In 1802, the villagers massively participated in proceedings claiming civil rights and contesting the privileges of the ruling class.

This emersion of simple people as well as the new role of *kleftes* and *armatoloi* did not go unnoticed by some members of the upper class who acknowledged the role they played in the defense of the island. It became also apparent that the people of the island had the opportunity to participate in the changes of the period in both emerging but not yet shaped identities, that of citizen and that of soldier.

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βερό Κατσαντώνη και μερικούς άλλους, που δεν είναι εύκολο να συγκρατήσει κανείς τα όχι συνηθισμένα ονόματά τους. Αυτό τον πρώτο κύκλο πλαισίωσαν οι υπόλοιποι σε κύκλο επίσης καθισμένοι. Περάσαμε το πρωί ακούοντας από τους πιο εύλωτους τη διήγηση των κατορθωμάτων τους, που την ακολούθησε ένα γεύμα, που είχε όλα τα χαρακτηριστικά των ηρωικών συμποσίων που έψαλε ο Όμηρος, τέλος, μουσική, τραγούδι και χορός [...]». ΜΑΥΡΟΓΙΑΝΝΙΣ, *Ιστορία των Ιονίων νήσων. 1797-1815*, cit., Vol. 2, pp. 165-166.

Table I

			%	%
<b>Budget planning: 1/12/1798 – 30/11/1799</b>	<b>Piastres</b>	<b>Para</b>	<b>Military expenses</b>	<b>Total expenses</b>
Russian-Turkish Castle's garrison	8.212	29	27,50	25,07
2 companies: 2 captains, 2 sergeants, 4 corporals, 60 soldiers ( <i>fanti</i> ) [captains: Zuanne Vlassopoulos, Nikola Paleologos]	16.516	10	55,31	50,43
Captain's Konstantin Psoma brigantin (comprising 1 military captain, 1 captain, 12 <i>levanti</i> )	3.604	15	12,07	11,00
<b>Total A1</b>	28.333	5	94,88	86,51
<i>cernide</i> 's superintendent	540		1,81	1,65
<i>cernide</i> 's 2 captains	540		1,81	1,65
<i>cernide</i> 's 2 sergeants	60		0,20	0,18
Fortino's guard	180		0,60	0,55
rent for the barracks of Schiavoni (40 piastres), of Italiani (60 piastres), rent for the prison (108 piastres)	208		0,70	0,64
<b>Total A2</b>	1.528		5,12	4,67
<b>Total A1 + A2 (Military and defense expenses):</b>	29.861	5	100,00	91,17
other expenses (mostly wages of civilian officers), <b>A3:</b>	2.891	16		8,83
<b>Total expenses (A1+A2+A3)</b>	32.752	21		100,00
<b>Revenue</b>	43.298	11		
<b>Surplus</b>	10.545	30		

Sources: GSA, AL, GSA, AL, Φάκ. 38 (1789-1836), *Στατιστικοί Πίνακες*, No 17 (monthly budget); RONTOGIANNIS, *Ιστορία της νήσου Λευκάδος*, cit., vol. 2, p. 202; MACHAIRAS, *Πολιτική και Διπλωματική Ιστορία της Λευκάδος (1797-1810)*, cit., vol. 1, pp.162-163; Andreas M. ANDREADIS, *Περί της οικονομικής διοικήσεως της Επτανήσου επί Βενετοκρατίας*, vol. 2, Athens, Estia, 1914, pp.244-245.

Table II

Budget planning: 1/9/1799 – 31/8/1800			Expenses account: 1/9/1799 – 31/8/1800	
	Piastres	para	Piastres	Para
The castle's Russian garrison, departed on the 10th of July: 1 officer, 1 corporal, 15 soldiers ( <i>fanti</i> )	6.364	27	4.044	32
Russians who arrived after the departure of the previous			97	20
The castle's Turkish garrison: 1 officer, 1 corporal ( <i>bairaktar</i> ), 15 soldiers ( <i>fanti</i> )	6.364	27		
Turkish garrison: their number varied			2.927	10
1 artillery company under captain Giov. Parmezan (October 1st – end of August)			3.498	5
2 detachments of 24 <i>levanti</i> each, each one under the command of one <i>capo</i> (September the 1st – end of August)	11.862	20	11.700	
12 men recruited when the Russians departed (July 6th – end of August)			412	20
2 captains of the detachments	1.200			
1 brigantin: 1 military captain, 1 captain, 12 <i>levanti</i>	3.604	35		
brigantin out of service: wages of its military captain, its captain and of 2 <i>levanti</i> (till end of June)			543	30
<b>Total (A1), military expenses</b>	29.396	10	23.223	37
Extra expenses, <b>A2</b>			3.384	3
<b>Total (A1 + A2)</b>			26.608	
superintendent (commander) of the <i>cernide</i> , Lorenzo Aleandri	540		293	20
2 captains of the <i>cernide</i> , Domenico Giallina, Giovanni de Pikoli	540		540	
sergeant of the <i>cernide</i> , Filippo Montesanto	180		180	
captain Nikola Paleologo			600	



sergeant Zuane Vlassopoulo (part payment)				100	
sergeant of the <i>cernide</i> , Gerassimo Kakurato				194	27
rent for the <i>leventi</i> 's barracks	40			70	
<b>Total A3</b>	1.300			1.977	
<b>Total of military and defense expenses (A1 +A2 + A3)</b>	30.696	10		28.586	7
other expenses (mostly wages of civilian officers), <b>A4</b>	3.736			10.772	
<b>Total expenses (A1 + A2 + A3 + A4)</b>	34.432	10		39.358	7
<b>Revenue</b>		17		45.029	26
<b>fund balance (September 1st, 1799)</b>				1.448	32
<b>Total revenue</b>	45.253			46.478	18
<b>Surplus</b>	10.821	7		7.120	10

#### Wages according to the budget:

officer: 120 para/day

corporal: 52:20 para/day

soldier: 35 para/day

*leventi*'s captain: 50 para/day

*leventi*: 25 para/day

brigantin's military captain: 60 para/day

brigantin's captain: 35 para/day

brigantin's *leventi*: 25 para/day

*cernide*'s force

superintendent: 45 piastres/month (approx. 60 para/day)

captain: 22:20 piastres/month (approx. 30 para/day)

sergeant: 15 piastres/month (approx. 20 para/day)

Sources: GSA, AL, GSA, AL, *Στατιστικοί Πίνακες* (budget & expenses); RONTOGIANNIS, *Ιστορία της νήσου Λευκάδος*, cit., vol. 2, pp. 203-206 (expenses); MACHAIRAS, *Πολιτική και Διπλωματική Ιστορία της Λευκάδος (1797-1810)*, cit., vol. 1, pp.164-165 (expenses); ANDREADIS, *Περί της οικονομικής διοικήσεως της Επτανήσου επί Βενετοκρατίας*, vol. 2, cit., pp. 246-247(expenses).

Table III

<b>Budget planning: 1/4/1802 – 31/3/1803</b>			<b>Expenses account: 27/3/1802 – 7/10/1802</b>	
6 companies of <i>leventi</i> (1 captain, 17 <i>leventi</i> )	25.650	for 6 months	14.440	20
adjutant (March 15th – March 31th)	125			
lieutenant (May 1st – March 31th)	330			
lieutenant (June 1st – March 31th)	270			
2 companies of villagers (1 captain, 20 <i>leventi</i> each) serving on rotation	9.900		4.950	
artillery	2.556	for 7 months	1.351	
castle's restoration			1.848	12
expenses on salaries mostly on soldiers			7.076	27
<b>Total A1</b>	38.831		29.666	19
Extra expenses:	2.500		2.824	10
bills accumulated by the representatives of the island to Constantinople and Petrograd	2.000		2.000	
for 240 cecchini, for the rest of the 4 months' advance to <i>the Deputati del Popolo</i>	1.980		1.960	
<b>Total A2 (Extra expenses &amp; expenses on delegations)</b>	6.480			
Military and extra expenses, <b>A1 + A2</b>	45.311		36.450	29
Brigantin's captain, Konstantin Psoma	540			
superintendent (commander) of the <i>cernide</i> , Lorenzo Aleandri	384			
2 captains of the <i>cernide</i> , Domenico Giallina and Giovanni de Pikoli	540			
sergeant Filippo Montesanto (sergeant's salary: 15 piastres for 3 months, 30 piastres as he was promoted to lieutenant)	45			
commander of the castle, captain Nikola Paleologo	600			

debt to lieutenant colonel Zuanne Vlassopoulos	315			
rent for the court and the barracks of <i>lev-enti</i>	148			
<b>Total A3</b>	2.572			
Military and defense expenses, <b>A1 + A3</b>	41.403			
other expenses, mostly wages of civilian officers, <b>A4</b>	9.617			
<b>Total expenses (A1 + A2 + A3 + A4)</b>	<b>57.500</b>			
<b>revenue</b>	58.393		45.055	35
<b>last year's fund balance</b>	8.804	36		
	67.197	36		
<b>surplus</b>	9.697		8.605	6

Wages:

captain: 37:20 piastres/month

*leventi* & villagers: 18:30 piastres/month

adjutant: 10 piastres/month

lieutenant: 30 piastres/month

brigantin's military captain: 45 piastres/month

*cernide*'s superintendent: 32 piastres/month

*cernide*'s captain: 22:20 piastres/month

the castle's captain: 50 piastres/month

Sources: GSA, AL, GSA, AL, *Στατιστικοί Πίνακες* (budget & expenses); RONGOIANNIS, *Ιστορία της νήσου Λευκάδος*, cit., vol. 2, pp. 207-209 (budget).

Table IV

<b>Expenses account: 1/3/1806 – 31/5/1806</b>			%
Russian garrison (3 months)	1.758		12,72
3 months wages to Captain Christo Thoma of <i>Corpo Macedone</i> , to his soldiers & to Russian officers (for 2 months)	5.195	10	37,59
preparation of Russian barracks	73	25	0,53
imperial army: payment to the boat that transferred them	262	20	1,90
Russian officers' furniture: Colonel Zangel's <i>scrittorio</i>	80		0,58
Russian canon ships: on canons transferred to the Castle & on the rent of a warehouse	53	16	0,38
furniture for the service of <i>Magistratura all'annona</i> & rent of a room to congregate	203		1,47
rent of a house for court & rent of a house for the residence of <i>Corpo Macedone</i>	49	20	0,35
Garrison's oil (3 months)	60	30	0,43
invalid Russian soldiers (food and medicine)	430	30	3,11
invalid prisoners	175	5	1,27
Extra expenses	196		1,42
<b>Total A1</b>	8.537	36	61,78
Wages:			
captain Giovanni Mattei, major of the castle	152		1,10
superintendent of the <i>cernide</i> , Lorenzo Aleandri	120		0,87
adjutant of the <i>cernide</i> commander, Spiridion Vasilaki	50		0,36
Nikolo Kavada, 1st legion's captain	80		0,58
conte Spiridion Zankarol, 2nd legion's captain	80		0,58
Zuane de Pikoli, 1st legion's adjutant	50		0,36
Filippo Montesanto, 2nd legion's adjutant	50		0,36
Antonio Zankarol, legion's secretary	50		0,36
<b>Total A2</b>	632		4,57
salaries of civilian officers, <b>A3</b>	1.442	28	10,43
<b>Total expenses: A1 + A2 + A3</b>	10.611	28	76,79
2 % on the revenues (160.397: 37 piastres) of two previous years, <b>A4</b>	3.207	38	23,21
<b>Total expenses (A1 + A2 + A3 + A4)</b>	13.819	26	100,00
<b>Revenue</b>	35.424	24	
<b>Surplus</b>	21.604	38	

Sources: GSA, AL, GSA, AL, *Στατιστικοί Πίνακες* (expenses); RONGOIANNIS, *Ιστορία της νήσου Λευκάδος*, cit., vol. 2, pp. 210-213 (expenses).

Table V

<b>Expenses: 1/6/1806 – 31/8/1806</b>			%
Russian officers of the Castle	1.769	10	8,88
wages to the officers of C.C. Christo Thoma's <i>Corpo Macedone</i> for 2 months until the end of May and for 4 sergeants, 4 corporals, 77 soldiers for half June	985	35	4,94
3 months wages to captain Draco Griva's company, major of the <i>Corpo Macedone</i> (4 officers, 4 sergeants, 4 corporals, 68 soldiers)	4.914		24,66
expenses for the invalid prisoners (3 months)	198	5	0,99
expenses for invalid Russian soldiers (food and medicine)	859	2	4,31
expenses on rents (buildings used as <i>gran garde</i> and prison, court, Pritany's residence, Censorio's residence)	1.781	10	8,94
Expenses for the preparation of the Russian soldiers barracks & a year's rent of an officers' house	545		2,73
expenses on garrison's oil	60	30	0,30
2 canon ships' crew member salaries (2 months)	829		4,16
salaries of the military guard of these ships	812	4	4,07
restoration of these ships	960	5	4,82
expenses on the Russian army: payment of the boat that transferred Russian officers & things from a Russian fregata	45	20	0,23
extra expenses	211	28	1,06
<b>Total (A1)</b>	<b>13.971</b>	<b>29</b>	<b>70,10</b>
Wages:			
captain Giovanni Mattei, major of the castle	349	9	1,75
superintendent of <i>cernide</i> , Lorenzo Aleandri (4 months)	240		1,20
adjutant of the <i>cernide</i> commander, Spiridon Vasilaki	100		0,50
Nikolo Kavada, 1st civic legion's captain	160		0,80
conte Spiridion Zankarol, 2nd civic legion's captain	160		0,80
Zuanne de Pikoli, 1st civic legion's adjutant	100		0,50
Filippo Montesanto, 2nd civic legion's adjutant	100		0,50
Antonio Zankarol, civic legion's secretary	100		0,50
<b>Total (wages) A2</b>	<b>1.309</b>	<b>9</b>	<b>6,57</b>
wages of civilian officers, <b>A3</b>	4.651	9	23,34
<b>Total expenses: A1 + A2 + A3</b>	<b>19.931</b>	<b>28</b>	<b>100,00</b>
<b>Revenues</b>	52.143	12	
<b>Surplus</b>	32.211	34	

Sources: GSA, AL, GSA, AL, *Στατιστικοί Πίνακες* (expenses); RONTOGIANNIS, *Ιστορία της νήσου Λευκάδος*, cit., vol. 2, pp. 214-218 (expenses).

**Table VI**

<i>Ruolo della Truppa Civica della Città ed Isola di Santa Maura</i>		%
Superintendent Colonel	1	
Colonels' adjutant	1	
secretary	1	
legions' captains	2	
captains' adjutants	2	
<b>CITY</b>		
6 detachments of 50 soldiers each in 2 legions	300	11,16
captains	6	0,22
chiefs of tens	30	1,12
reserve soldiers (6 detachments of 50 soldiers each)	300	11,16
reserve captains	6	0,22
reserve chiefs of tens	30	1,12
Total (CITY)	672	25,00
<b>VILLAGES</b>		
16 detachments of 50 soldiers each in 2 legions	800	29,76
captains	16	0,60
chiefs of tens	80	2,98
reserve soldiers (20 detachments of 50 soldiers each)	1.000	37,20
reserve captains	20	0,74
reserve chiefs of tens	100	3,72
Total (VILLAGES)	2.016	75,00
<b>Total (CITY and VILLAGES)</b>	2.688	100,00

In the above list, we have counted the total number of the two legions; in the total number, we included a corps of 50 men who were not listed in the document.



Table VII

Men of <i>Truppa Civica</i>							Census data from 1788				
			total	Cap- tains	chiefs of tens	Total	Population		Total	% <i>Trup- pa civica</i> / males 14-60	% <i>Truppa civica</i> / popu- lation
	1 le- gion	2 le- gion					males 14-60	males	popu- lation		
City	300	300	600	12	60	672	1.392	2.182	4.116	48,28	16,33
Alatro	10	10	20		2	22	57	133	269	77,19	16,36
Caradiat- ica	10	10	20		2	22					
Alexan- dro	30	20	50	1	5	56	115	197	354	48,70	15,82
Apolpena	10	10	20		2	22	42	78	138	52,38	15,94
Athani	30	60	90	2	9	101	112	178	331	90,18	30,51
Calamici	40	40	80	2	8	90	92	189	341	97,83	26,39
Caligoni	10		10		1	11	58	86	165	18,97	6,67
Caria	70	130	200	4	20	224	232	349	651	96,55	34,41
Cariotes	10	20	30	1	3	34	40	89	164	85,00	20,73
Cattocori	30	30	60	2	6	68	144	209	397	47,22	17,13
Catuna	20	20	40	1	4	45	50	89	163	90,00	27,61
Comiglio	20	20	40		4	44	57	95	172	77,19	25,58
Condare- na	20	10	30	1	3	34	77	124	249	44,16	13,65
Diamigli- ani	40	50	90	1	9	100	162	256	476	61,73	21,01
Dragano	20	40	60	1	6	67	75	116	227	89,33	29,52
Engluvi	30	20	50	1	5	56	162	269	529	34,57	10,59
Exanthia (Epano)	20	30	50	1	5	56	56	105	205	100,00	27,32
Exanthia (Kato)	20	10	30	1	3	34	40	70	127	85,00	26,77
Eviero	20	20	40		4	44	64	103	191	68,75	23,04
Frini	20	20	40	1	4	45	104	189	331	43,27	13,60
Fterno	10	10	20	1	2	23	48	77	141	47,92	16,31
Marando- cori	10	20	30	1	3	34	100	162	329	34,00	10,33

Neocori	10	20	30	1	3	34	65	93	210	52,31	16,19
Platistoma	10	10	20			2	22	31	50	85	70,97
Poros	40	40	80	1	8	89	124	199	372	71,77	23,92
San Pietro	30	30	60	2	6	68	138	227	442	49,28	15,38
Sant'Elia	20	20	40	1	4	45	71	144	278	63,38	16,19
Sfachiotes	60	160	220	4	22	246	196	352	641	125,51	38,38
Sivros	20	10	30			3	33	81	151	311	40,74
Vafcheri	30	20	50	1	5	56	81	148	307	69,14	18,24
Vurnica	10	20	30	1	3	34	44	89	192	77,27	17,71
Zucalades	20	20	40	1	4	45	47	90	153	95,74	29,41
Total (A)	1.050	1.250	2.300	46	230	2.576	4.157	6.888	13.057	61,97	19,73
Meganissi (Epano Meri)		30	30	1	5	36					
Meganissi (kato Meri)		20	20			20					
Total (Meganissi included)	1.050	1.300	2.350	47	235	2.632					

A corps of 50 men, their leader and their 5 *capi* are not listed in the document.

Sources: GSA, AL, 05.01.06.007. No 14, *Ruolo della truppa civica della città ed isola di Santa Maura, di carte scritte e numerate cinquanta una No 51*.; ΛΙΑΤΑ, «Καλοί μας ομόφυλοι και γενναίοι Κερκυραίοι... Έκκληση των Λευκαδίων για συμμετοχή τους στο μεταρρυθμισμένο πολίτευμα της Επτανήσου Πολιτείας (1802)», cit., pp. 76-77.

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Teke on the Akarnanian shore. Source: <https://1821.lefkasculturalcenter.gr/>.

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