

NUOVA

**ANTOLOGIA**



# MILITARE

RIVISTA INTERDISCIPLINARE DELLA SOCIETÀ ITALIANA DI STORIA MILITARE

N. 4  
2023

Fascicolo 14. Marzo 2023  
**Storia Militare Antica**

a cura di  
MARCO BETTALLI ED ELENA FRANCHI



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### *Nuova Antologia Militare*

Rivista interdisciplinare della Società Italiana di Storia Militare  
Periodico telematico open-access annuale ([www.nam-sism.org](http://www.nam-sism.org))  
Registrazione del Tribunale Ordinario di Roma n. 06 del 30 Gennaio 2020



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Grafica: Nadir Media Srl - Via Giuseppe Veronese, 22 - 00146 Roma  
[info@nadirmedia.it](mailto:info@nadirmedia.it)

Gruppo Editoriale Tab Srl -Viale Manzoni 24/c - 00185 Roma  
[www.tabedizioni.it](http://www.tabedizioni.it)

ISSN: 2704-9795

ISBN Fascicolo 978-88-9295-682-7

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L'“Erzspanngeschütz” dell'ingegnere tedesco Erwin Schramm (1856-1935): ricostruzione ipotetica del χαλκοτόνον (Chalkotonon, pezzo di artiglieria con molla di bronzo) di Filone Alessandrino. Vetrina con ricostruzioni di pezzi di artiglieria meccanica nel Museo del Castello di Saalburg in Assia (Germania). Particolare dalla Foto di SBA73 2007, su Flickr (Artilleria experimental romana a Saalburg). CC SA 2.0, Wikipedia Commons.



## *Between honour and tactics*

### The deployment for the “hoplite” battle

by ALESSANDRO CARLI\*

ABSTRACT: Scholarship has taken for granted the pre-eminence of the right side in the array according to a long-standing reading the debate before the Plataea’s battle (Hdt., IX 26-27). In this essay, we will review the positions among scholars and the same Herodotean chapters to suggest an alternative explanation. Then, reading some battle of the 5<sup>th</sup> and 4<sup>th</sup> centuries, we will advance an interpretation of the deployment process that is workable with cultural settings and tactics.

KEYWORDS: PLATAEA, HONOUR, GENERALSHIP, DEPLOYMENT, HOPLITES

When it was time to deploy the troops in preparation for an upcoming battle, all generals are required to regard the rank of each ally deferentially. This statement is emblemized among scholars by a notorious case of study: the debate held before the battle of Plataea. In the summer of 479, having the Greeks gathered at the Isthmus and the Athenians joined the expedition at Eleusis, the coalition under the leadership of regent Pausanias arrived at the foot of the Cithaeron<sup>1</sup>. During the arrangement for the impending battle against the Persians, each troop stood side by side, yet, at some point, the Tegeates and the Athenians began a heated argument over who should have the other position in the deployment. In the present case, they would have stationed themselves in the opposite side compared to the Spartans: both opponents claimed such right invoking ancient and recent deeds that have entered in their poleic memory<sup>2</sup>. Indeed, these

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1 Cf. Hdt., IX 19; Sim., Fr. 11 W<sup>2</sup> 29-41. On these movements and chronology cf. John LAZENBY, *The Defence of Greece. 490-479 B.C.*, Aris & Phillips, Warminster, 1993, pp. 217-219; Peter GREEN, *The Greco-Persian Wars*, University of California Press, Berkeley – Los Angeles – London, 1998, pp. 241-243; George CAWKWELL, *The Greek Wars. The Failure of Persia*, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2005, pp. 111-112.

2 Form methodological problems regarding the employment of these categories vd. Giorgia

enterprises granted to them a firm commitment for their self-perception and pride. After they have finished the argument, the Spartan army, as judge, shouted loudly and chose the Athenians, but not wishing to offend the Tegeates, they placed their Peloponnesian ally at their next left side. In short, these Herodotean passages in the Histories' ninth book are the bone of contention within the current debate.

At this point, the question inevitably arises: what tangible role did honour play in the deployment of "hoplite" battles compared to mere tactics? This question is not incidental considering the fact that, apart from a few exceptions, the major battles were fought not by an individual *polis* against her rivalry, usually a neighbouring city; rather these engagements took place between coalitions, sometimes old-settled agreements or covenants set down by necessity. As we deal with further in detail, being on good terms with the co-belligerent is not only the main key in keeping relationships up among *poleis* but also in order to counterbalance symmetrically the role of the leading *polis*.

The issue about the preservation of honour in the sight of the battle has been brought up by scholars, who were reading the Plataean debate, have phrased this assumption: in the perception of the Greeks, the right side is the pre-eminent place of honour undoubtedly, while the left side is the second place in importance. For convenience in our discussion, we can name this postulate the *Plataean pattern*. However, through a detailed review of the Herodotean text, the such idea gives rise to more problems and enclosed doubts than an ultimate explanation. Above all, suffice to consider that if the general or the best hoplites were deployed, for instance, on the left, such as at Leuctra or in the centre as at Mantinea, we are in front of exceptions to the alleged "rule".

Even if this assumption has been questioned recently<sup>3</sup>, scholars have dropped the nub of the matter on the honour's noteworthiness in the deployment. Furthermore, that being the case, having gone over the leading theories on the

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PROIETTI, *Prima di Erodoto. Aspetti della memoria delle Guerre Persiane*, Franz Steiner Verlag, Stuttgart, 2021, pp. 12-35.

3 Vd. Roel KONIJNENDIJK, *Classical Greek Tactics. A Cultural History*, Brill, Leiden – Boston, 2018, pp. 116-126, which we will shortly discuss at length. For an example of the scholarship reserve about the honour's influence, in the latest discussion about hoplite's phalanx Richard TAYLOR, *The Greek hoplite Phalanx. The iconic heavy infantry of Classical Greece*, Pen & Sword, Philadelphia, 2021, p. 330 and p. 509 n. 11, although he admits the considerations of Konijnendijk on this matter, confesses that the traditional scheme, or even matter, the *Plataean pattern* does not require other reviews because of his clearness.



Fig. 1 Scontro (Othismos) fra opliti dipinto nel Vaso Chigi. Olpe tardo protocorinzia, realizzata a Corinto, datato stilisticamente a ca. 650-640 a.C. Rinvenuto poco a nord di Veio, nella Tenuta Chigi, in una tomba a camera in un tumulo sul Monte Aguzzo presso Formello, nel 1881. Museo Nazionale Etrusco di Villa Giulia, inv. 22679. Foto Dan Diffendale, 2014, licensed (CC BY-NC-SA 2.0), Flickr.

dichotomy honour-tactics in the hoplite battles, we would shed light on some highlighted pieces of the debate brushing aside the *Plataean pattern*. At least, we would deal with the major battles of the 5<sup>th</sup> and 4<sup>th</sup> centuries in order to grasp how generals have behaved picking tactics to prevail in battles and, likewise, considering the rank of their allies.

In the light of an overall analysis, there are five tendencies covered by scholarship facing the deployment and its implications with honour. Some assumptions tend to link up and butt up to others, other hypotheses, instead, hold a more independent path.

First of all, any review concerning the right side in the deployment has to deal with the unavoidable and seminal essay published in 1960 by Pierre Lévêque and Pierre Vidal Naquet<sup>4</sup>. To sketch such trailblazing paper, their main theory regards

4 Pierre LÊVÊQUE – Pierre VIDAL NAQUET, «Epaminondas Pythagoricien ou le probleme tactique de la droite et de la gauche», *Historia: Zeitschrift für Alte Geschichte*, Vol. 9, No. 3,

the military innovations promoted by Epaminondas at Leuctra in a perspective which is following some Pythagorean principles. However, few years later, validated criticisms have emerged and their position has been rightly questioned, objections that we follow without hesitations<sup>5</sup>. Furthermore, putting aside the questions on Leuctra yet treated by others, we would like to add some reflections in order to review the predominance of right side not in its being, but in its military fulfillments. If due consideration is not given, sources' overreading springs up. In this regard suffice to note that, in the first pages of the article, the authors connote the right side through these words: «*Cette disposition est à ce point naturelle à l'esprit grec*». It is also not unusual to find expressions as “*la primauté de la droite*” and statements along the same line. A least instance above all, speaking about the Theban deployment at Delion, Pierre Lévêque and Pierre Vidal Naquet say: «*les Thébains sont ranges très normalment à l'aile droite*». Clearly, the use of *normalment* without explanation being made is simply a preconception, like the other cases we have just alluded to. This prejudice, then, leads the authors to assert that the right is preeminent and, *de facto*, it implies that the resulting honour is closely embedded in that side. According to them, it is displayed in two well-known cases: on the one hand, at Marathon, it can be noticed that the right's position is up to the *polemarch* such as, on the other hand, the usual place of kings in the Spartan army's deployment. Nevertheless, the texts of these provided examples controvert the authors' statements. For Marathon, the text does not touch on the pre-eminence of the right side<sup>6</sup>. Furthermore, according to the sentence literally, Herodotus suggests that this habit of the *polemarch* was no longer in use in his times<sup>7</sup>. Indeed, as regards the Spartan kings in the

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(1960), pp. 294-308.

- 5 Cf. John BUCKLER, «Epameinondas and Pythagoreanism», *Historia: Zeitschrift für Alte Geschichte*, Vol. 42, No. 1, (1993), pp. 104-108. This paper was also affected by previous researches: John BUCKLER, «Epameinondas and the “Embolon”», *Phoenix*, Vol. 39, No. 2, (1985), pp. 134-143.
- 6 The paper of Pierre Lévêque and Pierre Vidal Naquet became the turning point for the commentators too: Giuseppe NENCI, *Erodoto. Le Storie. Libro VI. La battaglia di Maratona*, Fondazione Lorenzo Valla, Milano, 1998, p. 284 explained that, until Leuctra, the right side was the honorary position unarguably. In his description of the battle, Peter KRENTZ, *The Battle of Marathon*, Yale University Press, New Haven – London, 2010, p. 153 judged the polemarch's station as traditional. The same is argued by Everett E. WHEELER, «The General as Hoplite», in Victor D. Hanson (ed.), *Hoplites. The Classical Greek Battle Experience*, Routledge, London, 1998, p. 134.
- 7 On Callimachus' role William SHEPARD, *The Persian War in Herodotus and Other Ancient*

*Lakedaimonion Politeia*, Xenophon employing the word ἄγημα does not allude to the wing in positioning troops as Pierre Lévêque and Pierre Vidal Naquet have argued; rather he mentions the column of the army during the march<sup>8</sup>. That's more: in the famous Xenophontean explanation of Spartan manoeuvres, the general sets himself and his fellows on the right or on the left side where he is more protected<sup>9</sup>. Is there another underlying cultural background?

The second group is made up of those scholars who do not simply handle this topic in their studies. Ruling out those who do not rise to the issue for the sake of concern<sup>10</sup>, then others unconditionally take for granted the *Plataean pattern*, which has become yet the standard system for battles between phalanges. It is not unusual to discover in their essays statements about the spontaneousness and the obviousness regarding the right side's prominence<sup>11</sup>. Since the topic is not

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*Voices*, Osprey Publishing, London, 2019, pp. 127-128. Hdt., VI 111.1 : «τοῦ μὲν δεξιῶν κέρους ἡγήετο ὁ πολέμαρχος Καλλιμάχος ὁ γὰρ νόμος τότε εἶχε οὕτω τοῖσι Ἀθηναίοισι, τὸν πολέμαρχον ἔχειν κέρας τὸ δεξιόν». The sentence is explanatory (γὰρ), it was not taken for granted that the general was on the right side regardless.

- 8 Pierre LÉVÊQUE – Pierre VIDAL NAQUET, Epaminondas, cit., p. 295 on Xen., *Lac. Resp.*, 13.6: «ἦν δὲ ποτε μάχην οἴωνται ἔσσεσθαι, λαβὼν τὸ ἄγημα τῆς πρώτης μόρας ὁ βασιλεὺς ἄγει στρέψας ἐπὶ δόρυ, ἔστ' ἂν γένηται ἐν μέσῳ δυοῖν μόραιν καὶ δυοῖν πολεμάρχων». Michael LIPKA, *Xenophon's Spartan Constitution. Introduction. Text and Commentary*, Walter de Gruyter, Berlin – New York, 2002, p. 218 suggests that Xenophon is envisaging the Lacedaemonians on march. As rightly noted by Christopher MATTHEW, *A Storm of Spears. Understanding the Greek Hoplite at War*, Pen & Sword Military, Barnsley, 2012, p. 169 in this passage we can see that the king was on the right side but not in its end, rather he was positioned between two battalions (ἐν μέσῳ δυοῖν μόραιν). Xenophon, indeed, seems to be referring more to the centre-right than the right.
- 9 Xen., *Lac. Resp.*, «ὅτι δὲ ὁ ἄρχων εὐώνυμος γίγνεται, οὐδ' ἐν τούτῳ μειονεκτεῖν ἡγοῦνται, ἀλλ' ἔστιν ὅτε καὶ πλεονεκτεῖν. εἰ γὰρ τινες κυκλοῦσθαι ἐπιχειροῖεν, οὐκ ἂν κατὰ τὰ γυμνά, ἀλλὰ κατὰ τὰ ὀπλισμένα περιβάλλοιεν ἄν». Notably the historian is speaking about the Spartan army in general, then in the same poleic army there is no prearranged predilection for the right side. Regardless on this manoeuvre in the Spartan army vd. John K. ANDERSON, *Military Theory and Practice in the Age of Xenophon*, University of California Press, Berkeley – Los Angeles, 1970, pp. 106-107.
- 10 In his book on wars against Persia George B. GRUNDY, *The Great Persian War and Its Preliminaries. A Study of the Evidence, Literary and Topographical*, Charles Scribner's Sons, London, 1901, pp. 468-469 dropped the argument between Athenians and Tegeates saying: «he (i.e. Herodotus) dearly loved that kind of traditional history».
- 11 Scott M. RUSCH, *Sparta at War. Strategy, Tactics, and Campaigns, 550-362 BC*, Frontline Books, London, 2011, p. 57 does not treat the argument between Tegeates and Athenians, but without any questions he believes that: «The Spartans had the Greek right wing, the post of highest honour». Cf. Paul M. BARDUNIAS – Fred E. RAY JR., *Hoplites at War. A Com-*

covered by them exhaustively, there is no way to formulate specific critiques of their thesis. However, this compelling trend is likely to peter out the research on hoplites and their attitudes, fading away not only battle's mechanics, but also anthropological attitudes.

The third category is built up by those who underline the correlation between the right side and tactical needs, sometimes blending their argumentations with cultural settings. All thought unavoidably comes from the textbook example of a clash between hoplites: the account of Mantinea's battle in 418. As it is well known, Thucydides reports the tendency of each hoplite to have been brought about to drift to the right, needing to protect himself because of his unshielded side, that is the right<sup>12</sup>. Trying to avoid breaking up the whole line, the army therefore tends to go along in the same direction<sup>13</sup>. In accordance with the authority of a long-standing academic tradition<sup>14</sup>, the right place in the deployment then was due to the best hoplites<sup>15</sup>, the main and sole position – according to them – in

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*prehensive Analysis of Heavy Infantry Combat in the Greek World, 750-100 BCE*, McFarland & Company, Jefferson, 2016, p. 133.

- 12 Thuc., V 71.1. Vividly Simon HORNBLLOWER, *A Commentary on Thucydides. Volume III. Books 5.25-8.109*, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2008 notes: «For the drift to the right see all handbooks on ancient warfare». Anyway, the problem on the unshielded side's protection emerged in such passage is explained exhaustively by Adam SCHWARTZ, *Reinstating the Hoplite. Arms, Armour and Phalanx Fighting in Archaic and Classical Greece*, Franz Steiner Verlag, Stuttgart, 2009, pp. 162-164. Not including cases of irregular warfare (cf. Thuc., III 23.4), wrong manoeuvres could make vulnerable the exposed flank to the enemies: the reckless Cleon's about-turn at Amphipolis (Thuc., V 10.4), the Argives near the Corinth's wall (Xen., *Hell.*, IV 4.11-12), the misunderstanding between *polemarchs* at Nemea (Xen., *Hell.*, IV 2.22).
- 13 This Thucydides' section leads to countless interpretations, among which we follow Hans VAN WEES, *Greek Warfare. Myths and Realities*, Duckworth, London, 2004, pp. 185-187.
- 14 Such pattern arises from the fact that many battles were won by the right wing: Delium (Thuc., IV 96.4), Nemea (Xen., *Hell.*, IV 2.21) and Coronea (Xen., *Hell.*, IV 3.17-18), although in the last one the Argives fled without fighting. Cf. Johannes KROMAYER – George VEITH, *Heerwesen und Kriegführung der Griechen und Römer*, C. H. Beck'sche Verlagsbuchhandlung, München, 1928, p. 84. For the noteworthiness of this handbook for the history of studies and its limitations vd. Roel KONIJNEDIJK, «Who Wrote Kromayer's Survey of Greek Warfare?», *History of Classical Scholarship*, 2, (2020), pp. 1-17. The scheme argued by Kromayer and Veith has been followed through years: cf. George B. GRUNDY, *Thucydides and the History of His Age*, John Murray, London, 1911, pp. 270-271; Adam SCHWARTZ, *Reinstating*, cit., p. 233.
- 15 Strangely, the so-called “best hoplites” related to the right wing are a modern expression: sources extremely unusually denote the quality of the troops, in particular when they talk





Fig. 2 particolare Vasi Chigi. Wikipedia commons.

which the Greeks are used to overwhelm the enemies and thus prevail in battles. It follows that the left side of an army was inescapable to being outflanked by the opponent's right wing; by fending off this threat, before or during the battles some skilled generals often made sure it would not happen<sup>16</sup>.

Over the years, this clichéd thesis focused on tactical needs and mechanics has been put together with notions that take into account anthropology: such as other cultures, the Greeks have perceived the right as the natural position of strength, of vigour, and therefore as the dominant one<sup>17</sup>. Meanwhile, the left was notoriously identified for its weakness and subordination to the other outstanding side. Consequently, urged by these preconceptions based on their cognitions culture and military needs, the Greeks would have believed to gather their best troops on the right side to have more hope of overwhelming their enemies. According to this postulate, tactical necessities and cultural attitudes go perfectly hand in hand<sup>18</sup>. However, these observations, although detailed, do not answer our question. For this reason, we would like to put three considerations across. Firstly, a necessary clarification: far be it from ours to deny that the Greeks

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about hoplites and the clashes between them. However, the Greek form for picked soldiers is *λογάδες*; they were usually employed for fast operations, where speed and agility were required, skills were given by their training or experience (cf. Thuc., II 25.3; IV 125.3; IV 127.2; IV 129.4; VI 96.3; 100.1; 101.4). Moreover, in the two “hoplite battles” where they are expressly mentioned, the *λογάδες* did ever not be on the right, but on the left such as the Corinthians at Potidaea (Thuc., I 62.6), or in the middle as the Argives at Mantinea (Thuc., V 62.2; 72.3; cf. V 73.3-4).

- 16 Having outnumbered the Lacedaemonian army the opponents (cf. Thuc., V 68.1; 71.2) particularly in their right side (Thuc., V 71.3), the Agiad king ordered two *polemarchs* to move to the left flank, fearing that his men on such side were outflanked by the enemies (Thuc., V 71.3). The controversial manoeuvre thought up by Agis II at Mantinea I vd. William J. WOODHOUSE, *King Agis of Sparta and His Campaign in Arkadia in 418 B.C.*, Oxford Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1933 pp. 88-90. While following the Thebans on the right, the Athenians on the left were afraid of being encircled by the Spartans at Nemea (Xen., *Hell.*, IV 2.19). Vd. Richard TAYLOR, *The Greek Hoplite*, cit., p. 345.
- 17 Robert HERTZ., «The pre-eminence of the right hand. A study in religious polarity», *HAU: Journal of Ethnographic Theory*, 3.2, (2013), pp. 335-337. Cf. for a reflections according ancient philosophers Paul CARTLEDGE, *The Greeks. A Portrait of Self and Others*, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2002, pp. 13-15.
- 18 This hypothesis is strongly argued by Fernando ECHEVERRIA REY, «Taktikè Technè – The Neglected Element in Classical “Hoplite” Battles», *Ancient Society*, Vol. 41, (2011), pp. 68-69, who follows the studies quoted in the previous note.



considered the right's worthiness. The sources are unequivocal<sup>19</sup>. Nevertheless, no source explicitly tells us or leads us to conclude that the right is perceived *a priori* as pre-dominant in the military sphere. Moreover, no ancient text utters a straight connection between the right side and honour, or rather links this position with an embedded honour. Secondly, this modern theory does not expound why some generals sometimes had in mind to win leading the head of the army on the left. And then, the alleged disregard for this side does not clarify at all why at Plataia the Athenians and the Tegeates argued stubbornly for being placed on the left. Last but not least the following tactical consideration: in order not to be outflanked by the enemies, the Greeks are notedly used to get the deployment's depth thinner<sup>20</sup>, yet the sources do not state that the best hoplites have been placed at both ends. Instead, the texts emphasise the need to deploy such soldiers in the front and rear line, to control inexperienced or coward comrades, who demanded an effective model<sup>21</sup>. In short, the alleged best hoplites deployed necessarily in the right is more a modern construction than an ancient military urgency.

The fourth category in our topic is set forth only by the honour theory of John Lendon. In a series of polythematic researches, he often counterbalances historical essays on singular topics with studies based on Greek culture and anthropology, giving rise to appreciable and well-thought-out analysis<sup>22</sup>. According to his view

19 As shown by Pierre LÉVÊQUE – Pierre VIDAL NAQUET, «Pythagoras», cit., pp. 294-301 many sources cover this matter. On this point the judgments of Plato (Plat., *Leg.*, 794d 3-795d 5) and Aristotle (Arist., *Eth. Nic.*, 1134b 33) weight.

20 On the phalanx's depth vd. William K. PRITCHETT, *The Greek State at War. Part I*, University of California Press, Berkeley – Los Angeles – London, 1971, pp. 133-144; cf. Adam SCHWARTZ, *Reinstating the Hoplite*, cit., pp. 167-171; Christopher MATTHEW, *A Storm of Spears*, cit., 172-179; Roel KONIJNENDIJK, *Classical Greek Tactics*, cit., pp. 126-138; Richard TAYLOR, *The Greek Hoplite*, cit., pp. 133-148.

21 The fact that an experienced soldier as Xenophon (Xen., *Mem.*, III 1.8; *Cyr.*, III 3.41-42; VI 3.25-27) underlines repeatedly this military need is evidence of its noteworthiness. For psychologic implications cf. Peter KRENTZ, «The Nature of Hoplite Battle», *Classical Antiquity*, Vol. 4, No. 1, (1985), p. 60; Adrian GOLDSWORTHY, «The Othismos, Myths and Heresies: The Nature of Hoplite Battle», *War in History*, Vol. 4, No. 1, (1997), pp. 13-14; Adam SCHWARTZ, *Reinstating*, cit., p. 172; Jason CROWLEY, *The Psychology of the Athenian Hoplite. The Culture of Combat in Classical Athens*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2012, p. 57; Ellen MILLENDER, «The Greek Battlefield. Classical Sparta and the Spectacle of Hoplite Warfare», in Werner Riess – Garret G. Fagan (eds.), *The Topography of Violence in the Greco-Roman World*, University of Michigan Press, 2016, p. 166; Roel KONIJNENDIJK, *Classical Greek Tactics*, cit., pp. 183-184.

22 Cf. John LENDON, «Homeric vengeance and the outbreak of Greek Wars», in Hans van

and method, in a fleeting passage of his well-known book<sup>23</sup>, Lendon fleshes out the *Plataean pattern*: if the right place in the deployment corresponds to the most honoured place, the left is up to the second contingent by value. Moreover, the position set on the left of the extreme right is due to the third ally in the coalition for importance. It is quite clear that the yet-rooted *Plataean pattern* emerges as a kind of Olympic podium according to his account. The starting point of such theorisation, regrettably, is not spelt out by Lendon and no other ancient battles are mentioned to endorse his hypothesis in addition to Plataea. However, even if he does not give it away expressly, it is likely that a late source affects him<sup>24</sup>. Indeed, the lack of parallel episodes and the fact that sources do not touch on anything of the kind invalidate Lendon's argument.

The fifth last and most up-to-date position concerning the debate on honour and deployment has been written up and reviewed by Roel Konijnendijk<sup>25</sup>. As well as an all-embracing survey of the sources, his most striking merit is that he has shown how generals needed to see the appropriate place as a primary interest. This view is partially faithful. We will come back to the topic in due course. Regardless, the such argument may appear incidental, yet not taking for granted the right's side priority automatically<sup>26</sup> is a significant step forward in research on the subject. However, although his analysis is noteworthy, it does not talk around the role he gives to the concept of honour. In this regard, according to him, the fact that the best hoplites – yes, he still uses this academic formula – face

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Wees (ed.), *War and Violence in Ancient Greece*, The Classical Press of Wales, Swansea, 2000, pp. 1-30; ID., «Athens and Sparta and the Coming of the Peloponnesian War», in Loren J. Samons II (ed.), *The Cambridge Companion to The Age of Pericles*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2007, pp. 258-281; ID., *Song of Wrath. The Peloponnesian War Begins*, Basic Books, News York, 2010.

23 John LENDON, *Soldiers and Ghost. A History of Battle in Classical Antiquity*, Yale University Press, New Haven – London, 2005, pp. 41-42.

24 Vd. Ask1., *Tact.*, 3.1: «Διατέτακται δὲ ἢ τε ὅλη φάλαγξ καὶ τὰ μέρη κατὰ τετράδα, ὥστε τῶν τεσσάρων ἀποτομῶν τὴν μὲν ἀρίστην κατ' ἀρετὴν τοῦ δεξιῦ κέρατος τετάχθαι δεξιάν, τὴν δὲ δευτέραν ἀριστερὰν τοῦ λαιοῦ καὶ δεξιάν τὴν τρίτην, τὴν δὲ τετάρτην τοῦ δεξιῦ λαιάν. Οὕτω γὰρ διατεταγμένων ἴσον εἶναι συμβήσεται κατὰ δύναμιν τὸ δεξιὸν κέρασ τῷ λαιῷ». For this passage vd. Antonio SESTILI, *Asclepiodoto. Manuale di Tattica (Techne Taktike)*, Società Editrice Dante Alighieri, Roma, 2011, p. 99

25 Roel KONIJNENDIJK, *Classical Greek Tactics*, cit., pp. 116-139 is the most accurate account on the matter.

26 An example above all vd. William K. PRITCHETT, *The Greek State at War. Part II*, University of California Press, Berkeley – Los Angeles – London, 1974, pp. 190-207

those best opponents will match honour with tactics. Furthermore, going along with some studies<sup>27</sup>, Konijnendijk dismisses the debate between Athenians and Tegeates, suggesting Herodotean additions underneath the words. To put it in other words, he does not clear up the Plataean debate and, such as others, does not settle the concept of honour.

As mentioned in the introduction to this paper, before proposing a possible explanation of the Greek's attitudes during the deployment, it is indispensable to take apart the *Plataean pattern*. We break down some highlighted sections of the debate. Firstly, the tradition of the reception of this argument has a false start: already in his time, in a context of harsh criticism of Herodotus and his historical method, Plutarch has reservations about its total genuineness<sup>28</sup>. The possibility of an Athenian invention lies over not so much to the biographer's opinion as to that of modern scholars<sup>29</sup>. However, without going too far, it is clear that in Herodotus' time the claims of both contenders are deemed legitimate. Regardless, making an effort to persuade the Spartans, the Tegeates and the Athenians disputed to bring off the *other position*<sup>30</sup> in the deployment. This latter Herodotean statement might seem incidental, yet it is pivotal to get to the bottom of our question: τὸ ἕτερον κέρασ, the so-called other wing, unveils beyond doubt that it is not a predetermined and fixed position. Instead, it must be contextualized taking into account first of

27 Roel KONIJNENDIJK, *Classical Greek Tactics*, cit., p. 124 n. 71. See further.

28 Vd. Plut., *De Herod. Mal.*, 871 a-b. On this passage vd. Marco BETTALLI, «Erodoto e la battaglia di Platea. Tradizioni epicoriche e strategie narrative», in Maurizio Giangulio (ed.), *Erodoto e il modello erodoteo*, Università di Trento, Trento, 2005, pp. 215-216.

29 Cf. Lieselotte SOLMSEN, «Speeches in Herodotus' Account of the Battle of Plataea», *Classical Philology*, Vol. 39, No.4, (1944), pp. 148-149, strictly followed by Ray NYLAND, «Herodotus' Sources for the Plataiai Campaign», *L'Antiquité Classique*, Vol. 61, (1992), p. 88. James A. S. EVANS, «Herodotus and the Battle of Marathon», *Historia: Zeitschrift für Alte Geschichte*, Vol 42, No. 3, pp. 279-280 underlines that Herodotus represents the prevailing opinion in his time.

30 The modern tendency to see the left side as the second honourable position relies on Plutarch. It does not seem an accident his definition in Plut., *De Herod. Mal.*, 872a: «εἰς ἀγῶνα λέγει περὶ τῶν δευτερείων». Vd. Anthony BROWEN, *Plutarch. The Malice of Herodotus*, Aris and Phillips, Warminster, 1992, pp. 144-145. In his time, the story has its standardized tradition regarding the Athenians' victory of the second place, as if it were a prize, but it takes issue with Herodotus. Firstly, he does not call it as award, rather he says: Hdt., IX 26.1: «ἐδίκαιον γὰρ αὐτοὶ ἐκάτεροι ἔχειν τὸ ἕτερον κέρασ». It is simply the other side as opposed to the leading Spartan contingent.

all where the general would have stayed. Only afterwards Herodotus, indeed, affirms that this fought over side is the left place in the deployment and only afterwards the reader gets to know that the ten-thousand Lacedaemonians are placed on the right<sup>31</sup>. This interpretation can be given rise from the words of the two opponents and it can be a crossroad for a viable explanation.

Immediately the Tegeates set about having it out: among all allies they saw only themselves fit for the other position in the deployment (Ἡμεῖς αἰεὶ κοτε ἀξιούμεθα ταύτης τῆς τάξιος ἐκ τῶν συμμάχων ἀπάντων)<sup>32</sup>. This hard-hitting claim has its roots in the glorious Peloponnesian past of the Tegeates, who often have performed some heroic deeds, such as the expulsion of the Heracleidae and others<sup>33</sup>. Because of these enterprises acknowledged by the coalition, they attained considerable prerogatives among the Peloponnesians, including that of commanding the other wing during military expedition (καὶ τοῦ κέρους τοῦ ἐτέρου αἰεὶ ἡγεμονεῦειν κοινῆς ἐξόδου γινομένης). This statement assumes their hegemonical position treasuring the priority role of Sparta in any case. In addition to the thorny issue of the killing of Hyllus, as if to make matters worse, the Tegeates unexpectedly remarked to the Spartans about the numerous

31 On the first mention of the left vd. Hdt., IX 28.6. Cf. Hdt., IX 28: «Μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα ἐτάσσοντο ὧδε οἱ ἐπιφοιτῶντές τε καὶ οἱ ἀρχὴν ἐλθόντες Ἑλλήνων. Τὸ μὲν δεξιὸν κέρας εἶχον Λακεδαιμονίων μύριοι». No Herodotus' word on the honour linked to the right side, he shows simply the position of Spartans.

32 The employment of the verb ἀξιούμεθα (cf. Hdt., IX 26.6: ἀξιονικότεροι) denotes not only a self-perception of their valour but also a status approved by the Peloponnesians, that is the most numerous coalition's contingents. Such verb must be linked with the Athenian reply in Hdt., 27.6: «ἀπὸ τοῦ ἐν Μαραθῶνι ἔργου ἄξιοί εἰμεν». Here the use of ἄξιοί stands for a self-demand of rank. On the concept of ἄξιος vd. Stefano FERRUCCI, «AXIOS», in Carmine Ampolo – Ugo Fantasia (eds.), *Lexicon Historiographicum Graecum et Latinum*, Edizioni della Normale, Pisa, 2007, pp. 52-59. The opponents move in a system of agonistic values: Raoul LONIS, *Guerre et religion en Grèce à l'époque classique*, Les Belles Lettres, Paris, 1979, pp. 25-37.

33 Hdt., IX 26. For other sources vd. Friderich PRINZ, *Gründungsmythen und Sagenchronologie*, C. H. Beck'sche Verlagsbuchhandlung, München, 1979, pp. 420-440. Cf. Pietro VANNICELLI, *Erodoto e la storia dell'alto e medio arcaismo (Sparta – Tessaglia – Cirene)*, Gruppo Editoriale Internazionale, Roma, 1993, pp. 27-28. Irad MALKIN, *Myth and territory in the Spartan Mediterranean*, Cambridge University Press, 1994, pp. 40-42; Annie SCHNAPP-GOURBEILLON, *Aux Origines de la Grèce XIII<sup>e</sup>-VIII<sup>e</sup> siècles avant notre ère. La genèse du politique*, Les Belles Lettres, Paris, 2002, pp. 136-157; John C. DAYTON, *The Athletes of War. An Evaluation of the Agonistic Element in Greek Warfare*, Edgar Kent Publishers, Toronto, 2006, pp. 38-39; Robert L. FOWLER, *Early Greek Mythography, II, Commentary*, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2013, pp. 334-346.





Fig. 3 Anfora Tirrenica del pittore di Gamos, 560 a. C. Monaco, Staatliche Antikensammlungen, stanza 2, Inv. 1429 (=J 127). Foto Bibi Saint-Pol, 2007, Wikimedia Commons.

victories against them<sup>34</sup>. It has been rightly noted that the Tegeates' behaviour towards the leaders of the coalition come across as being irreverent to the limits of counteractive<sup>35</sup>. However, they are just claiming what they are entitled to and

34 Hdt., IX 26.7 alludes to the wars fought between Sparta and Tegea some decades before (Hdt., I 66-68). Among the many contributions in this field cf. Luigi MORETTI, *Ricerche sulle Leghe Greche (Peloponnesiaca-Beotica-Licia)*, "Erma" di Bretschneider, Roma, 1962, p. 26 sgg.; Pietro VANNICELLI, *Erodoto e la storia*, cit., pp. 57-67; Mait KÕIV, *Ancient Tradition and Early Greek History. The Origins of States in early-archaic Sparta, Argos and Corinth*, Tallin, 2003, pp. 72-76 Paul RAHE, *The Spartan Regime. Its Character. Origins, and Grand Strategy*, Yale University Press, New Haven – London, 2016, pp. 114-117. For the relationship between Sparta and Tegea vd. Antony ANDREWES, *Sparta and Arcadia in the Early Fifth Century*, *Phoenix*, Vol. 6, No. 1, (1952), pp. 1-5.

35 David ASHERI – Aldo CORCELLA, *Erodoto. Le Storie. Libro IX. La battaglia di Platea*, Fon-

then they dump their previous statements saying: «We are certainly not opposing you, Lacedaemonians, but we leave you the choice of the wings that you want to command; just the other affirms that it is up to us to be in charge as in the past»<sup>36</sup>. In short, Tegea endorsed the leading role of Sparta and gave the due respect to her, yet at the same time she expected a consoling attitude to her rank; the relationship among allies was mutual and reciprocal. What emerges from our source is the unquestioned chiefs' authority – in the present case the Spartans – among the coalition regarding their acknowledged right to choose where to stay in the array. Even just starting from the text, we are able to deduce that honour does not be embedded in a specific side, as many times it has been pointed out by scholars, rather it belongs to those who have the role of hegemon. Therefore, the leader, as we will see on following pages, can pick out the place where he intends to defeat the enemy. Just at that point he can bring off honour.

The Athenians' prompt reply was not long in coming. To prove their superiority over the Tegeates, they mentioned many deeds, from their help to the Heracleidae, going through other well-known episodes such as the Trojan war, the defeat of Amazons, and so on<sup>37</sup>. What the Athenians highlighted most is the glorious victory at Marathon, where they not only had defeated many populations under the Persian empire but also had gained experience against a specific enemy. With this seemingly insignificant statement, though striking rhetoric, they are aware of hitting the right note with the Spartans. The latter often paid much attention to the skills and experience gained with a particular enemy<sup>38</sup>. If these words are not

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dazione Lorenzo Valla, Milano, 2006, p. 213 judge the Tegeates's statement as a misstep, meanwhile Michael A. FLOWER – John MARINCOLA, *Herodotus. Histories. Book IX*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2002, p. 149 commentates subtly: «amazingly tactless», then they explain how the Tegeates would achieve respect.

36 Hdt., IX 26.6: «Υμῖν μὲν νῦν, ὃ Λακεδαιμόνιοι, οὐκ ἀντιούμεθα, ἀλλὰ διδόντες αἴρεσιν ὀκοτέρου βούλεσθε κέρεος ἄρχειν παρίμεν· τοῦ δὲ ἐτέρου φαμὲν ἐς ἡμέας ἰκνέεσθαι ἡγεμονεύειν κατὰ περ ἐν τῷ πρόσθε χρόνῳ». Vd. David ASHERI – Aldo CORCELLA, *Erodotο*, cit. pp. 212-213.

37 All the episodes mentioned in Hdt., IX 27 are exhaustively explained by Giorgia PROIETTI, *Prima di Erodotο*, cit., pp. 416-419 and pp. 427-434, although her account could not be shared fully.

38 Hdt., IX 27.5 must be compared with Hdt., IX 46.3, the controversial chapter where the wings are exchanged temporally after the polite Athenians' suggestion to Pausanias. For the current positions among ancient sources and current scholarship vd. David ASHERI – Aldo CORCELLA, *Erodotο*, cit. pp. 240-241. Regardless, when the Spartans affirm that they are unexperienced with Persians, meanwhile they are used to fight Thesalians and

enough to win the listeners over, the ending of the discourse is simply diriment. Indeed, the Athenians concluded: «At present, however, it is not convenient to be in discord for the deployment, but we are ready to follow you, Spartans, where it seems to you that it is the most suitable place to put us and against whom: in fact, where we will be deployed, we will try to be brave. Give us directions, and we will carry out the orders»<sup>39</sup>. What appears to be most noteworthy in the Athenian reply to the readers' eyes is their respectful behaviour towards the Spartans. With an oppose attitude from that well-known of subsequent years, this accommodating conduct is prompted by the fact that Athens, such as the other present allies, endorsed the Spartan leading role. In this respect, the reference of the concept of στάσις is not trifling<sup>40</sup>: the leadership has been yet talked over, in front of the enemy all the *poleis*, including Athens, ought to carry out the orders since they acknowledged the Spartan leadership in unison<sup>41</sup>.

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Boeotians, it must be joined with their attention to military experience and skills. This theme among Lacedaemonians is widespread in Thucydides: in Archidamus' statements before and during war (cf. Thuc., I 80.1; II 11.1) and in Brasidas' exhortations (cf. Thuc., IV 126.3; V 9.1). Vd. Anna MAGNETTO, «ἐμπειρία», in Carmine Ampolo – Ugo Fantasia (eds.), *Lexicon Historiographicum Graecum et Latinum*, Edizioni della Normale, Pisa, 2015, pp. 228-246. Cf. the noteworthy reflections of Jeannine BOËLDIEU-TREVET, *Commander dans le monde grec au Ve siècle avant notre ère*, PUFC, Comté, 2007, pp. 123-127.

39 Hdt., IX 27.6: « Ἄρ' οὐ δίκαιοί εἰμεν ἔχειν ταύτην τὴν τάξιν ἀπὸ τούτου μόνου τοῦ ἔργου; Ἄλλ' οὐ γὰρ ἐν τῷ τοιαῦδε τάξιος εἵνεκα στασιάζειν πρέπει, ἄρτιοί εἰμεν πείθεσθαι ὑμῖν, ὧ Λακεδαιμόνιοι, ἵνα δοκέει ἐπιτηδεότατον ἡμέας εἶναι ἐστάναι καὶ κατ' οὐστυνας· πάντη γὰρ τεταγμένοι πειρησόμεθα εἶναι χρηστοί. Ἐξηγήεσθε δὲ ὡς πεισομένων». Vd. David ASHERI – Aldo CORCELLA, *Erodoto*, cit. pp. 218-217. Regardless, the reiteration of the verb πείθω is an undeniable mark of the subordination to the leading-*polis*.

40 It cannot be shared the reading given to Hdt., IX 27.6 by Giorgia PROIETTI, *Prima di Erodoto*, cit. p. 418: through the verb στασιάζειν the Athenians level cutting remarks to the Spartans because of their unwillingness to give in to their strategic proposal. Actually, the passages need to be compared with the Athenian behaviour in Hdt., VIII 3.1: «εἰ στασιάσουσι περὶ τῆς ἡγεμονίας, ὡς ἀπολέεται ἡ Ἑλλάς, ὀρθὰ νοεῦντες», followed immediately by the Herodotus' ammonition; Hdt., VIII 3.1: «στάσις γὰρ ἔμφυλος πολέμου ὁμοφρονέοντος τοσοῦτω κάκιον ἐστὶ ὅσῳ πόλεμος εἰρήνης». The context is that of Athens' claim to lead the fleet, yet the allies oppose even threatening to leave the coalition, if they were not led by a Spartan general.

41 In the *Histories* this question often arises: Gelon's demand (Hdt., VII 160), the reluctance of Argos (Hdt., VII 148-4-149.2), the Athenian approval too (Hdt., VII 161.2) except the *impasse* before Artemisium (Hdt., VIII 3.1). On the accepted Spartan hegemony during Persian War cf. generally Paul CARTLEDGE, *Sparta and Lakonia. A Regional History. 1300-362 B.C.*, 2002, pp. 176-183; Paul RAHE, *The Grand Strategy of Classical Sparta. The Per-*

According to the Greeks' point of view, honour is not tied to a set place. Everything concerning the deployment depends on the will of who holds the command. On the one hand, the Spartans, as leaders, were empowered to give orders to follow; on the other hand, as leading polis, they had to be respectful of each ally's rank. They appreciated the Athenian experience for the upcoming battle, but at the same time, they placed the Tegeates near them in the deployment. For a principle of mutual reciprocity<sup>42</sup>, in addition to tactical needs<sup>43</sup>, their Peloponnesian ally had to be treated based on their position. It is therefore no coincidence that without doubt Herodotus accounts two reasons for the Spartan choice: the Tegeates possessed not only the martial virtues, workable talent for the oncoming fight, but also they owned the rank to stay near the close by the general<sup>44</sup>. Just here the latter intended to defeat the enemy. If the battle is won, the Tegeates can actively participate in the victory, carrying off satisfactions for their previous claim of pre-eminence among the other *poleis*. In front of this self-evident episode, no pre-established place in the array is set up; having opted for a specific position in the deployment, the leading *polis* can express the acknowledgment of the ally's rank, enjoying the honour after the enemies' defeat.

Since it has been noticed the untenableness of the alleged *Plataean pattern*, rather the debate described by Herodotus displays an inch-perfect behavioural system, in which the allies move before clashes. Starting from the features and the suggestions turned up in the previous pages, what follow intends to shed light

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*sian Challenge*, Yale University Press, New Haven – London, 2015, pp. 202-205. Into a more thorough analysis vd. John WICKERSHAM, *Hegemony and Greek Historians*, Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, London, 1994, pp. 4-23.

42 Vd. Polly LOW, *Interstate Relations in Classical Greece. Morality and Power*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2007, pp. 36-54.

43 If the Tegeates had a long-standing right according to their claims, no one ever rose the question why the Athenians wanted to fight on the left. They had recently shown all the allies their valour, that justified and endorsed their claim. Before the argument with the Tegeates, they not only resisted against the Persian cavalry, but also forced back the enemies during the fight for the Masistius body's recovery (Hdt., IX 20-23).

44 Remember that Tegea was a principal ally for Sparta, agreement from which the Peloponnesian league had to be structured. Cf. G. L. HUXLEY, *Early Sparta*, Faber and Faber, London, 1962, p. 68 and pp. 136-137; A. H. M. JONES, *Sparta*, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1968, pp. 44-45; David C. YATES, «The Archaic Treaties between the Spartans and Their Allies», *The Classical Quarterly*, Vol. 55, No. 1 (2005), pp. 65-76.



on how these elements were current in the battles of the 5<sup>th</sup> and 4<sup>th</sup> centuries. We will quote few clashes between hoplites, where our sources made broad hints regarding some behaviours. Of course, the sources took several mechanics unknown for the today's readers as read.

There are four key stages that come about in a certain lapse of time before the battle: appointing a leader as a head of a coalition, opting where to win the fight, facing the proper rival and looking after the allies' rank. The last two were a concomitant phenomenon.

The issue of who held the hegemony is not just a recurring topic in ancient historians but a knotty point when it was sure to fight the enemies<sup>45</sup>. When well-structured and long-established coalitions had to face a battle, there were no issues. In the sources, indeed, there are no episodes where some allies disagreed with the leaders before an upcoming battle, otherwise to divest them of authority. That is the background of the Peloponnesian League: although this coalition had displayed some well-known rifts in some situations throughout its history, the allies always followed Sparta without arguments when they were summoned to fight. Spartan accustomed hegemony among the Peloponnesian cities was recognized as a matter of fact, and her overriding rank was endorsed among the *poleis*<sup>46</sup>. The same thing, from the Athenian side, can be said with the war against Persia, at least until the Peace of Kallias<sup>47</sup>. However, the context changed in the Peloponnesian war, when various communities called on Sparta

45 On the current debate with a detailed bibliography vd. Emma LUPPINO-MANES, *Egemonia di terra ed egemonia di mare. Tracce del dibattito nella storiografia tra V e IV sec. a. C.*, Edizioni dell'Orso, Alessandria, 2000 pp. 9-24. Cf. Richard I. WINTON, «Thucydides 1, 97, 2: The “arche of the Athenians” and the “Athenian Empire”», *Museum Helveticum*, Vol. 38, No. 3, (1981), pp. 147-152; John WICKERSHAM, *Hegemony*, cit. several times.

46 Reflections worth noting by Gregory CRANE, *Thucydides and the Ancient Simplicity. The Limits of Political Realism*, University of California Press, Berkeley – Los Angeles – London, 1998, pp. 76-92. Cf. Sarah BOLMARCICH, «Thucydides 1.19.1 and the Peloponnesian League», *Greek, Roman, and Byzantine Studies*, (2005), pp. 5-34.

47 Vd. Peter J. RHODES, «The Delian League», David M. Lewis – John Boardman – John K. Davies – Martin Ostwald, (Eds.), *The Cambridge Ancient History. Second Edition. Volume V. The Fifth Century B.C.*, pp. 34-61. For the theory of “Peace of Kallias Problem” vd. Polly Low, «Hegemonic legitimacy (and its absence) in Classical Greece», in Mirko Canevaro – Andrew Erskine – Benjamin Gray – Josiah Ober (Eds.), *Ancient Greek History and Contemporary Social Science*, Edinburgh University Press, Edinburgh, pp. 445-446.

and Athens to step in on their military issues. An out-standing episode on this matter is the Olpae's battle in 426<sup>48</sup>: Spartan authorities dispatched Eurylochus to be in chief of Peloponnesian troops and their allies from Aitolia. After the failure of the main expedition, then he held the leadership after Ambracia's request for military involvement. All the Thucydidean description displays the Eurylochus' agency during military operations, meanwhile, the cobelligerents went along with his instructions simply. On the other side, the request for a prompt aid to Demosthenes from the Acarnanians is explanatory. The latter was made up of various local communities, and they, with their friends Amphilocheians, appointed the Athenian general as *hegemon* of all the coalition accompanied by their local captains<sup>49</sup>. On the one side, if the preference naturally fell upon a Spartan and an Athenian for their recognized role. On the other hand, it is striking how before up-coming battles communities felt the compelling need to establish leadership in the absence of precedents, taking into account the temporariness of the coalition too.

This circumstance also occurred in the case of uncommon alliances, in which the contractors came from two opposing sides; sometimes, some agreements came about late before battles had to be formalized officially. In this regard, the "Quadruple Alliance" in the anti-Spartan perspective drawn up by Athens, Argos, Mantinea and Elis is an exemplary case. Suppose the agreement between Athens

48 Thuc., III 106-108. On the battle: cf. Bernard W. HENDERSON, *The Great War between Athens and Sparta*, Macmillan & Co., London, 1927 pp. 151-167; Donald KAGAN, *The Archidamian War*, Cornell University Press, Ithaca – London, 1974, pp. 210-213; Fred Eugene RAY JR., *Land Battles in 5Th Century B.C. Greece, A History and Analysis of 173 Engagements*, McFarland & Company, Jefferson – London, 2009, pp. 168-172; Lawrence A. TRITTE, *A New History of the Peloponnesian War*, Wiley Blackwell, Oxford, 2010, pp. 78-80; Jennifer T. ROBERTS, *The Plague of War. Athens, Sparta and the Struggle for Ancient Greece*, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2017, pp. 117-118.

49 Thuc., III 107.2: «ὡς μαχοῦμενοι τοῖς ἐναντίοις, καὶ ἡγεμόνα τοῦ παντός ξυμμαχικοῦ αἰροῦνται Δημοσθένη μετὰ τῶν σφετέρων στρατηγῶν». Is of paramount importance the expression ἡγεμόνα τοῦ παντός ξυμμαχικοῦ αἰροῦνται: the Acarnanians felt the necessity of a leader when they understood that the battle was coming (ὡς μαχοῦμενοι τοῖς ἐναντίοις). On the alliance between Athens and Acarnanians cf. Sebastiana N. CONSOLO LANGHER, «Problemi del federalismo greco. Il koinon acarnano in Tucidide», *Helikon. Rivista di tradizione e cultura classica dell'Università di Messina*, Vol. 8, pp. 258-259; Id., *Stati federali greci. Focidesi, Calcidesi di Tracia, Acarnani*, Sicania, Messina, 1996, pp. 253-258; Ugo FANTASIA, «Formione in Acarnania (Thuc. II 68, 7-8) e le origini della Guerra del Peloponneso», *Incidenza dell'Antico*, Vol. 4, (2006), pp. 59-98.



Fig. 4. Combattimento di opliti, Museo di Atene. Foto Grant Mitchell, 2006. Wikimedia Commons.

and Argos does not rise to marked problems since the two cities owned well-known correlations and reciprocal contacts in the 5<sup>th</sup> century<sup>50</sup>. In that case, we cannot state the same for Mantinea. Notoriously she was one of the most loyal Spartan allies, even during the dodgy moments of the Lacedaemonians<sup>51</sup>; regardless,

50 For a balanced prospectus vd. Cinzia BEARZOT, *Argo nel V secolo: ambizioni egemoniche, crisi interne, condizionamenti esterni*, in Cinzia Bearzot – Franca Landucci (Eds.), *Argo. Una democrazia diversa*, Vita e Pensiero, Milano, 2006, pp. 123-139.

51 Among the Arkadians, Mantinea carried on being Sparta's ally during the so-called Third Messenian War (cf. Thuc., I. 102.1; II 27.2; III 54.5; IV 56.2; Xen., *Hell.*, V 2.3). Cf. Konrad WICKERT, *Der peloponnesische Bund von seiner Entstehung bis zum Ende des archidamischen Krieges*, Inaugural-dissertation, 1961, pp. 47-49; Anton POWELL, *Athens and Sparta. Constructing Greek Political and Social History from 478 BC*, Routledge, London – New York, 2001, p. 111.

something in their friendship came apart<sup>52</sup>, and the break was followed by the agreement with long-standing Sparta's enemies. Reckoning with the long-standing rivalry with Argos for hegemony in the Peloponnese, it is likely that at Sparta the news regarding the treaty between Mantinea and Argos made a lot of noise more than the other one contracted with Athens. In the present case, Thucydides reports the treaty, in which, among the various covenants, there was the convoluted matter of hegemony on the battlefield. Indeed, he writes: «The city that has requested (i.e., military support) has the command with the army when the war takes place in its territory: if it seems appropriate to all the contracting cities to make a joint expedition in some place, share in equal conditions the hegemony among all the cities»<sup>53</sup>. Clearly, the pivotal key-word in this clause is the concept of hegemony. Each city had its pride and therefore demanded recognized respect; indeed, *poleis* mutually behaved like individuals. Afterwards, in a system of relations among *poleis* with no established and customary hierarchy based on rank, setting the record straight previously was essential to keep away from friction with allies.

In this respect, it is, therefore, no coincidence what happened just before the battle of Nemea<sup>54</sup> in 394: the coalition was settled, all in all, recently, and the contractors had not often been gathered to each other, as a matter of fact not many years before during the Peloponnesian war they had also been enemies<sup>55</sup>. In this context, after the Timolaus' discourse with some suggestion which the allies would have fought the Spartans, Xenophon reports the on-the-spot conduct of the allies: «At that time, therefore, they discussed command and agreed in how many

52 Thomas H. NIELSEN, *Arkadia and its Poleis in the Archaic and Classical Periods*, Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, Göttingen, 2002, pp. 388-389; Ellen MILLENDER, «Sparta and the Crisis of the Peloponnesian League in Thucydides' History», in Ryan K. Balot – Sara Forsdyke – Edith Foster (Eds.), *The Oxford Handbook of Thucydides*, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2017, pp. 92-93.

53 Thuc., V 47.7: «ἡ δὲ πόλις ἢ μεταπεμψαμένη <τῆ στρατιᾷ> τὴν ἡγεμονίαν ἐχέτω, ὅταν ἐν τῇ αὐτῆς ὁ πόλεμος ἦ· ἢν δὲ ποι δόξη <ἀπάσαις> ταῖς πόλεσι κοινῇ στρατεῦσθαι, τὸ ἴσον τῆς ἡγεμονίας μετεῖναι ἀπάσαις ταῖς πόλεσιν». Vd. Simon HORNBLLOWER, *A Commentary*, cit., p. 116 compares the passage with Xen., *Hell.*, VII 5.3.

54 Vd. César FORNIS, «MAXH KPATEIN en la Guerra de Corinto: Las Batallas Hopliticas de Nemea Y Coronea (394 A.C.)», *Gladius*, Vol. 23, (2003), pp. 142-150.

55 For the political scene vd. S. PERLMAN, «The Causes and the Outbreak of the Corinthian War», *The Classical Quarterly*, Vol. 14, No. 1 (1964), pp. 64-81. Cf. César FORNIS, *Grecia Exhausta. Ensayo Sobre la Guerra de Corinto*, Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, Göttingen, 2008, pp. 87-113.



files it was appropriate that the entire army arrayed»<sup>56</sup>. For the modern reader, it astonishes the antithesis between the two verbs employed by the Athenian historian. On the one hand, it is made use of the verb ὁμολογεῖν, agreeing on tactics, which usually is not stock for military matters. Meanwhile, regarding the hegemony, there was no meeting point. It must be considered that διαπράττειν, discussing, is the usual verb for deals, also of commercial trades: if we keep in mind the great pride of individual cities, the leadership was regarded as a pivotal matter and, if necessary, before reaching an agreement satisfactory to all, single allies were led to argue indefinitely. Nevertheless, it is worth noting a key driver that these episodes have in common: after choosing who could hold the hegemony, the allies followed his orders, acknowledging the leadership.

The appointment of a chief has repercussions in ensuing tactics. Likewise, the same generalship must live up to intrinsic expectations of its task<sup>57</sup>. The generals in the Classical period were used to perform heeding the authority assigned to them. In the “hoplite” battle, soldiers from their city or collected from numerous *poleis* were prompted to face the enemies following in the general’s footsteps. Notoriously, the so-called “face of command”<sup>58</sup> swung from a more wise behaviour to a rush one, according to the individual leader’s attitudes and the folds taken by the clashed. As it is predictable, in a world based upon an agonistic

56 Xen., *Hell.*, IV 2.13: «ἐν ᾧ δὲ περὶ ἡγεμονίας τε διεπράττοντο καὶ διωμολογοῦντο εἰς ὁπόσους δέοι τάττεσθαι πᾶν τὸ στράτευμα».

57 On generalship cf. John K. ANDERSON, *Military Theory*, cit., 67-83; Everett E. Wheeler, *The General as Hoplite*, cit., pp. 121-170; William K. PRITCHETT, «The general on the battlefield», in William K. Pritchett (ed.), *Essays in Greek History*, J. C. Gieben, Amsterdam, 1994, pp. 111-143; Jeannine BOËLDIEU-TREVET, «Commandement et institutions dans les cités grecques à l’époque classique», *Pallas*, Vol. 51, (1999), pp. 81-104; Godfrey HUTCHINSON, *Xenophon and the Art of Command*, Greenhill Books, London; ID. *Attrition. Aspects of Command in the Peloponnesian War*, Spellmount, Brimscombe Port Stroud, 2006; Jeannine BOËLDIEU-TREVET, *Commander dans le monde grec*, cit.; Rosemary MOORE, Generalship: Leadership and Command, in Brian Campbell – Lawrence A. Tritle (Eds.), *The Oxford Handbook of Warfare in the Classical World*, pp. 457-473; Joseph ROISMAN, *The Classical Art of Command. Eight Greek Generals Who Shaped the History of Warfare*, Oxford Classical Press, Oxford, 2017, pp. 1-25; Id., «Generalship», in Waldemar Heckel – Edward E. Garvin – John Vanderspoel (Eds.), *A Companion to Greek Warfare*, Wiley Blackwell, Hoboken, 2021, pp. 137-147.

58 For this expression vd. the reflections always noteworthy written by John KEEGAN, *The Mask of Command*, Johnathan Cape, London, 1987.

culture where Homer was a shining example of martial values<sup>59</sup>, the singular generals carried out the task by doing their utmost. Setting an example of martial values for their soldiers and the social pressure was two sides of the same coin. For instance, returning to their *poleis* after a defeat for the chiefs was, in the best scenario, shameful<sup>60</sup>. It is, therefore, no chance that various generals often died on battlefield<sup>61</sup>.

According to these series of attitudes and expectations tied with leadership, it is clear that the generals got involved in the battle to achieve victory directly. What is more remarkable: they aimed to defeat the enemy in the position where they had set themselves. Where this place was, it was not established *a priori*. As we have seen in the previous pages, honour was not linked up with a specific side in the deployment. The generals or the hegemonical *polis* hold the authority to lead the army as they opted for. Instead, at this point of the discussion, the question of honour and its alleged connection with the right side re-emerges inevitably. However, in comparison with the way it was covered by scholarship, this issue should be conducted from another point of view, taking into account what we have just seen about generalship. Not all, but several battles were won by the right-wing or rather they were set by the general at that point; the sources are unequivocal<sup>62</sup>. If many battles were decided on the right wing, it happened not for a sort of preconception on this side, instead for the well-known tendency described by Thucydides in which the armies were inclined to go along on the right. The leading-*polis*, who wanted to overwhelm the enemy at this point,

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59 This behaviour culturally turned has been explained by John LONDON, Homeric vengeance, cit., p. 3 with references. For agonistic component of warfare vd. John C. DAYTON, *The Athletes of War*, cit.

60 For the different juridical treatment of generals in Athens and Sparta cf. Debra HAMEL, *Athenian Generals. Military Authority in the Classical Period*, Brill, Leiden – Boston – Köln, 1998 pp. 118-140; Douglas M. MACDOWELL, *Spartan Law*, Scottish Academic Press, Edinburgh, 1986, p. 148.

61 Cf. Victor D. HANSON, *The Western Way of War. Infantry Battle in Classical Greece*, University of California Press, Berkeley – Los Angeles – London, 1990, pp. 113-115; Everett E. Wheeler, *The General as Hoplite*, cit., pp. 146-152; Fernando ECHEVERRIA REY, *Taktikè Technè*, cit., p. 56.

62 The Spartan often stayed on the right: beyond Plataea, Nemea (Xen., *Hell.*, IV 2.18), Koronea (Xen., *Hell.*, IV 3.16), Leuctra (Xen., *Hell.*, VI 4.12-14), Mantinea (Diod., XV 85.2). For other references vd. Fernando ECHEVERRIA REY, *Taktikè Technè*, cit., p. 56.

outflanked the left wing of the opponents<sup>63</sup>. If the generals set battles on that side, then they and those around them could get honour. Needless to say, it was a source of pride for a general have determined the outcome of the battle: he could display his exemplary role at best in front of all, including allies. Moreover, it is a matter of fact that the hoplites in right with the unshielded side were more defenceless to the enemy. The risk was higher than other places: they were forced to fight bravely and it is already possible that the rest of the army would be aware of this danger, as we have seen. Indeed, we point out that in this particular case, the right side did not own honour *in esse*, yet *in posse*, so to speak. Regardless, it straightforward that everything turned on the general's will. As a result, the battles in which the general decided to face the enemy in other positions than the right followed the same pattern. Once again it is cut-and-dried that honour was not embedded in a traditional side, yet it could come by fighting bravely. At this point, so as to understand the attitude culturally turned which *poleis* were used to fight, another question on this matter arises: why sometimes the generals choose to lead the army in other position than the right wing?

The generals had to respectfully heed the rank and pride of each ally, and they were required to keep in mind the various rivalry that took place between the contingents. When some coalitions were arranged, each *polis*, contracting the agreement, owed its reasons, grudges and deep-rooted hate against an individual rival of the opposing side. Clearly, after having been wronged, each ally craved to challenge their enemy during battles, to compensate for one or more offences endured before. This revengeful attitude often triggered off wars among *poleis*<sup>64</sup>. Aside from that cultural behaviour, which rested on a system of vengeance, it is clear why the general deployed their troops against some enemies. Firstly, they were perfectly aware of the psychological benefits derived of the motivation to

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63 The question regarding the outflanking's mechanics is described by Everett L. WHEELER, «Battle», in Philip Sabin – Hans van Wees – Michael Whitby (eds), *The Cambridge History of Greek and Roman Warfare. Volume I: Greece, the Hellenistic World and the Rise of Rome*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2007, pp. 216-219; Adam Schwartz, *Reinstating the Hoplite*, cit., 2009, pp. 172-175.

64 Among the various causes of war it is rightly outlined by Hans VAN WEES, *Greek Warfare*, cit., pp. 22-25. Cf. John LONDON, *Song of Wrath*, at various times.

fight. In this regard, as we will see in this section, the exhortations<sup>65</sup> that took place before clashes are pivotal. In addition, it cannot be ruled out that the allies themselves looked for this care from the leaders. Just as the hegemonic role was granted and respected by the coalition, those who held the leadership acted appropriately to countervail his leading position. Relations among *poleis* rested on the reciprocity's principle<sup>66</sup>.

Once again, the battle of Olpae is working to get to the bottom of these dynamics. Both generals spearheading the temporary coalitions consented to their allies to face the current opponent; for years, Ambraciots and Acarnanians heated each other<sup>67</sup>. At the same time, however, Eurylochus, as a Spartan, wanted to contend with the “colleague” of the opposite front. It is small wonder if underling this conduct it a duel-logic. Having faced the two armies for a few days without anyone have brought about the battle, the general attained that Demosthenes would have been deployed on the right. For this reason, owing the prerogative approved in compliance with his role to resolve how to arrange the battle, Eurylochus stayed on the left wing, where we would have outflanked Demosthenes and the Messenians, the well-known Athens' allies and notoriously enemies of Sparta<sup>68</sup>. Since Eurylochus thought to overwhelm the enemy so as to gain honour, he arranged the unit from Mantinea on his next right side. The latter, as we have seen before, could share the honour of the battle's outcome. Moreover, the possibility of killing the general of the enemies in a sort of duel would dishearten the opponents bringing about their retreat. In short, he intended to crush the head of the snake, so as to the fight wind up immediately. However,

65 Mogens H. HANSEN, «The Battle Exhortation in Ancient Historiography. Fact or Fiction?», *Historia: Zeitschrift für Alte Geschichte*, Vol. 42, No. 2, (1993), pp. 161-180; William K. PRITCHETT, «The General's Exhortations in Greek Warfare», in William K. Pritchett (ed.), *Essays in Greek History*, J. C. Gieben, Amsterdam, 1994, pp. 27-110.

66 Anna MISSIOU, «Reciprocal Generosity in the Foreign Affairs of Fifth-Century Athens and Sparta», in Christopher Gill – Norman Postlethwaite – Richard Seaford (eds.), *Reciprocity in Ancient Greece*, Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp. 181-197.

67 Expressly Thucydides uses the word ἔχθρα (Thuc., II 68.9). Vd. N. G. L. HAMMOND, *Epirus. The Geography, the ancient remains, the history and the topography of Epirus and Adjacent areas*, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1967, pp. 497-508.

68 Thuc., III 107.4: «Εὐρύλοχος ἔσχατον εἶχε τὸ εὐώνυμον καὶ οἱ μετ' αὐτοῦ, κατὰ Μεσσηνίους καὶ Δημοσθένην». The syntagm κατὰ Μεσσηνίους καὶ Δημοσθένην displays the Eurylochus' will of challenging them.





Fig. 5 Tesoro di Syphnos, fregio settentrionale, Santuario di Apollo, Delfi, 530 a. C.  
Foto Steven Zucker, Smarthistory co-founder, *licensed* (CC BY-NC-SA 2.0), Flickr.

the Demosthenes' strategy<sup>69</sup>, as is known, thwarted the plan of Eurylochus, who died fighting during the battle, and, as expected, his soldiers fled.

Another example of how rivalries were a driving force for battles is the thorough description by Thucydides on the array's mechanics and the exhortations before Mantinea. The allies mustered in Arkadia picked out a specific deployment following the principles that we have just exposed. Now then, let's go through it: in the previous pages of the V *Histories*' book, it is unambiguous that the Argives led the expedition<sup>70</sup>. Then, according to the covenant, they were the hegemonical

69 Thuc., III 108.1. Cf. Eric Charles WOODCOCK, «Demosthenes, Son of Alcisthenes», *Harvard Studies in Classical Philology*, Vol. 39, (1928), pp. 95-96; Max TREU, «Der Strategie Demosthenes», *Historia: Zeitschrift für Alte Geschichte*, Vol. 5, No. 4, (1956), pp. 426-428; Joseph ROISMAN, *The General Demosthenes and his Use of Military Surprise*, Franz Steiner Verlag, Stuttgart, 1993, pp. 29-30; Rose M. Sheldon, *Ambush. Surprise Attack in Ancient Greek Warfare*, Frontline Books, London, 2012, pp. 58-60.

70 The narrative starts with Argos realizing the Sparta's mobilization (Thuc., V 58.1), then Thucydides always cites the Argives and the allies (Thuc., V 58.1-2; 59.4; 60.3; 61.2; 64.1;

leading *polis* that had to perform in the specific way we have seen. If we take in mind this pivotal element, the Thucydidean account will be more clear-cut. Since the battle took place in Arkadians' land, Thucydides states that the Mantineians stayed on the right wing: coming about the clash in their homeland<sup>71</sup>, they were expected to assume more risks that were connatural on this side. Doubtless, the Argives, as leaders, took into consideration the rank of his ally, respecting him. On the other side, Agis II behaved in the same way: he deployed on the right wing the Tegeates, also Arcadians.

All the coalition had its rooted records against Sparta. Therefore the generals began to spur on their soldiers for the impending battle. The Mantineans, settled against the right Spartan wing, fought to defend their country in the name of their ἀρχή<sup>72</sup>. Meanwhile, the Argives placed themselves<sup>73</sup> in the middle, where they expected to defeat the Spartans. This choice does not wonder: they challenged the head of the enemies. Agis II was in the middle of his army too. Probably, the Spartan king would match Argos, according the same enemies' outlook culturally turned. Indeed, the Argives, as Thucydides states, fought in order to reassert their hegemony in the Peloponnese<sup>73</sup>. A victory against the old foe could uphold their claims of leadership. Also, the Athenians had deep-seated motives to enjoy that they were on the right wing: they could finally confront Sparta with brave allies.

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65.1; 65.5; 66.1; 70.1; 73.1) conferring to them the whole agency before, during after the battle of Mantinea.

71 On the current debate regarding Thuc., V 67.2 vd. Roel KONIJNENDIJK, *Classical Greek Tactics*, cit. pp. 116-117.

72 Thuc., V 69.1: «Μαντινεῦσι μὲν ὅτι ὑπὲρ τε πατρίδος ἢ μάχῃ ἔσται καὶ ὑπὲρ ἀρχῆς ἅμα καὶ δουλείας, τὴν μὲν μὴ πειρασαμένοις ἀφαιρεθῆναι, τῆς δὲ μὴ αὐθις πειρᾶσθαι». Cf. Peter FUNKE, «Between Mantinea and Leuctra. The Political World of the Peloponnese in a Time of Upheaval», in Peter Funke – Nino Luraghi (Eds.), *The Politics of Ethnicity and the Crisis of the Peloponnesian League*, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 2009, pp. 6-11; Maria PRETZLER, «Arcadia: Ethnicity and Politics in the Fifth and Fourth Centuries BCE», in Peter Funke – Nino Luraghi (Eds.), *The Politics of Ethnicity and the Crisis of the Peloponnesian League*, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 2009, pp. 86-109.

73 Thuc., V 69.1: «Ἀργεῖοις δὲ ὑπὲρ τῆς τε παλαιᾶς ἡγεμονίας καὶ τῆς ἐν Πελοποννήσῳ ποτὲ ἰσομοιρίας μὴ διὰ παντὸς στερισκομένους ἀνέχεσθαι, καὶ ἄνδρας ἅμα ἐχθροὺς καὶ ἀστυγείτονας ὑπὲρ πολλῶν ἀδικημάτων ἀμύνασθαι». Vd. Pietro VANNICELLI, *Erodoto e la storia*, cit., pp. 67-85; Id., «Eraclidi e Perseidi: Aspetti del conflitto tra Sparta e Argo nel V sec. A. C.», in Paola Angeli Bernardini (Ed.), *La città di Argo. Mito, Storia, tradizioni poetiche. Atti del Convegno internazionale (Urbino, 13-15 giugno 2002)*, Edizioni dell'Ateneo, Roma, 2004, pp. 279-294. Cf. Mait ΚΟΙΝ, *Ancient Tradition*, cit. pp. 333-338.



Fig. 6 vari simboli dipinti sugli scudi

This last motivation is not incidental: the Athenians had on their right side the coalition's leaders, hence they were able to benefit from the likely fruits of victory. However, their hopes were disregarded, and the Spartans with the Tegeates took advantage of the battle's outcome. After Mantinea, the doubts about the hegemonical Spartan leadership among the Peloponnesians were dispelled.

Years later, at Nemea, the same pattern occurred. The Thebans, who were the leading *polis*, opted to challenge not the Spartans, positioned on the opposite right, rather they plumped for staying on right of the coalition. In this regard,



it is already noteworthy their tergiversation: Thebes waited to make offerings until the Athenian were on the left so as to face the Spartans, their known rivals. Besides, Thebes was perfectly aware that Athens would have achieved her lost hegemonical role again. We can deduce that their relationship set up not long ago demanded mutual care: Thebes had talked Athens into been involved in this war. Therefore, it is straightforward to deduce that she had to live up to the Athenian expectations during the battle. Few weeks later, at Coronea<sup>74</sup>, according to this attitude, Thebes deployed Argos against Sparta in order to fulfil the expectations of the Peloponnesian ally, meanwhile, they yearned for to dare not Sparta but Orchomenus. This Boeotian city had breached his relations with Thebes<sup>75</sup>. Probably, the latter aimed to revenge the Orchomenus' about-turn. Then, all these episodes where uncommon coalitions were set up display how *poleis* attempted to challenge their rival, bearing in mind respectfully the allies' requirements.

To come to the conclusion of our discussion, there is an engrossing episode embracing all the elements that have emerged in the current analysis. In the V *Hellenica*'s book, Xenophon tells of the Olynthus's battles<sup>76</sup>, that took place in 382. The whole account sees as a protagonist the Spartan Teleutias, dispatched as general by the Spartan authorities to gather as many troops as possible for the expedition. Indeed, he owed the leadership of the coalition who respected him, as he was the king's brother. Since he had come near the enemies' city, he placed himself in the left wing to face the enemies when they would have gone outside the walls (οὕτω γὰρ ξυνέβαινε αὐτῷ κατὰ τὰς πύλας ἰέναι ἢ ἐξῆσαν οἱ πολέμιοι). There Teleutias was intended winning the upcoming clash, and as a leader, he wanted to perform his task at best to gain honour by setting an effective example to the soldiers. Therefore, he deployed his allies on the right. Moreover, a new ally joined the expedition against Olynthus: Derdas, the otherwise unknown leader of

74 César Fornis, «MAXH KPATEIN, cit., pp. 151-147; Id., *Grecia Exhausta*, cit, pp. 127-135.

75 Xen., III 5.6; V 1.29.Vd. John BUCKLER – Hans BECK, *Central Greece and the Politics of Power in the Fourth Century BC*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2009, pp. 19-20.

76 Xen., *Hell.*, V 2.37-42. For Teleutias vd. Noren M. HUMBLEE, *Xenophon's view of Sparta: A Study of the Anabasis, Hellenica and Respublica Lacedaemoniorum*, Thesis discussed in McMaster University, 1997, pp. 183-186. On his strategy Roel Konijnendijk, *Classical Greek Tactics*, cit., pp. 118-119 states that the general did not abandon tactics for honour.

Elimias. Teleutias was perfectly aware that the legitimation of his leadership was set with the usual allies but not with Derdas. For this reason, the Spartan deployed Derdas with his four-hundred cavalries close by him on the left wing (παρὰ αὐτῶ εἶχε Δέρδαν). Teleutias supposed that Derdas would have been placed to share this privilege (διὰ τὸ θεραπεύειν τὸν Δέρδαν ὡς ἠδόμενος παρείη). Therefore, it does not seem a case that Derdas repaid the consideration given to him by offering a weighty contribution to the battle.

Returning to the question posed at the beginning of this study, it is now possible to point out that the only tactics did not play a predominant and unique role in the arrangement for the “hoplite” battle. Unfortunately, the sources at our disposal give for inferred many dynamics underlying the attitudes of the *poleis* with allies. Nevertheless, after having debunk the hard to die *Plataean pattern*, the debate between the Tegeates and the Athenians displays some specific behaviours that can be turned up in other following battles. The appointment as a head of a coalition was the key-point from which all the groundworks leading to the upcoming battles emerged. Since no position in the array had an embedded honour, who hold the leadership could arrange the deployment at will; where the general decided to position himself was usually in the place where he intended to defeat the enemies. There he could take into account the rank of allies, sharing with them the possible fruits of victory. Moreover, the generals were bound to pay close attention to the current rivalries between his allied *poleis* and the other opponents. The generals counterbalanced their prerogatives guaranteed by their hegemonic role through some attitudes that went beyond mere tactical requirements.

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Rilievo con la liberazione di una città assediata; Impero Romano d'Occidente, inizi del V secolo, Museo d'Arte Bizantina (inv. 4782), Bode Museum, Berlino.  
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Costume Armor in the  
Classical Style Helmet  
includes original paper label  
of Hallé French ca. 1788–90.  
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